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INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
PARENTS IN THE WAKE OF GAY
MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS, AND
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS
DEBORAH L. FORMAN *
Abstract: This Article examines the parental rights of a same-sex
partner/spouse who is neither biologically related to, nor an adoptive
parent of, a child being raised by the couple. Using a hypothetical
example of a same-sex couple with one child, this Article explores
whether the parental rights granted to a non-biological parent by
marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership can and will survive a
move to another state that does not explicitly recognize such same-sex
relationships. Relying on statutory and common law precedents, this
Article argues that even in those jurisdictions that have enacted a mini-
Defense of Marriage Act, parental rights likely can survive the
invalidation of a same-sex relationship because the Uniform Parentage
Act, precedents regarding the legitimacy of children, and general
choice of law principles all provide potent arguments for advocates
seeking to preserve the parental rights of the same-sex partner.
* d 2004, Deborah L. Forman, Professor of Law, J. Allan Cook and Mary Schalling
Cook Children's Law Scholar, and Director, Center for Children's Rights, Whittier Law
School. I wish to thank my two outstanding research assistants—Center for Children's
Rights Fellows Jennifer Culhane and Laura Callahan—for their invaluable assistance and
the Whinier Law School for its support. '
Author's Note: It is axiomatic that the law is constantly changing, and readers of law
reviews are well aware that new cases, statutes, and events regularly intervene between the
time of Article submission and actual publication. I mention this phenomenon here be-
cause rarely has a topic generated the dramatic and rapid activity we are witnessing in the
battle over gay marriage. This Article was submitted for publication at the end of May
2004, and reflects the state of the law at that time. Since then, the first case involving an
interstate dispute over parental rights granted to a lesbian co-parent under Vermont's civil
union statute is pending before a Virginia appellate court. See Calvin R. Trice, Appeal Filed
in Custody Case; Woman's Latuyen Say Via Should Not Have Jurisdiction in Dispute, RicumoNn
Thus- Disimercit, Dec. 9, 2004, at $4, 2004 WLNR 14119989. Furthermore, the November
2004 election brought the number of states with Defense of Marriage Acts ("DOMA") to
forty-one. See NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, ANTI-GAY MARRIAGE MEASURES IN THE
U.S. (2005), available at http://wwwthetaskforce.org/downloads/marriagemap.pdf. It was
impossible to address adequately these and other developments during the editorial proc-
ess. A full discussion of these developments as they pertain to the interstate recognition of
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INTRODUCTION
On May 17, 2004, as the United States marked the fiftieth anni-
versary of the landmark civil rights case, Brown v. Board of Education,
gays and lesbians across the country celebrated a civil rights victory of
their own.I That day, Massachusetts became the first state to allow
same-sex couples to marry. 2
 The day capped a stunning eighteen
months that undoubtedly mark a watershed for gay rights. In the
summer of 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Texas
criminal sodomy statute as a violation of due process in Lawrence v.
Texas. 3
 Meanwhile, a series of Canadian court cases legalized same-sex
marriage in the most populous provinces in that country. 4
 A few
months later, on November 18, 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court declared in Good ridge v. Department of Public Health that the
law restricting marriage to individuals of the opposite sex was a viola-
tion of equal protection under its constitution and instructed the
Massachusetts legislature to remedy the violation within six months. 5
Nor did the pace of change slow in 2004. The Massachusetts decision
sparked a grassroots movement for the legalization of gay marriage in
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
2 Elizabeth Mehren, Massachusetts Begins Allowing Gays to Wed, L.A. TIMES, May 17,
2004, at A10.
3 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
4 See generally EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2003] 225 D.L.R. (4th) 472
(B.C. Ct. App.); Halpern v. Toronto (Att'y Gen.), [2003] 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529 (Ont. Ct.
App.); Hendricks c. Quebec (PG), 120021 RJ.Q. 2506 (Que. Super. Ct.); Elizabeth Me-
hren, Gay Couples Tic the Knot in Massachusetts, L.A. Timm, May 18, 2004, at A14; B.A.,
Robinson, Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, Same-Sex Marriages (SSM) in Can-
ada, at hup://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_marb.hun
 (last updated Feb. 27, 2005)
(noting that same-sex marriage is available to eighty percent of Canadians within their
province of residency). Federal draft legislation which would legalize same-sex marriage
throughout Canada is the subject of a reference case pending in the Canadian Supreme
Court. Kirk Makin, Denying Marriage to Gays Unfair: Ottawa Tells Court, GLOBE & MAIL (To-
ronto), Apr. 1, 2004, at A4. Final action on the bill is expected in 2005. Id.
5
 798 N.E.2d 941, 948, 970 (Mass. 2003). In response to Goadridge v. Department of
Health, Massachusetts legislators initially considered enacting a civil union or domestic
partnership statute. See Cheryl Wetzstein, Legislators Ditcuss Gay "Marriage": Massachusetts
Leaders Favor Civil Union Law, W. sit. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2003, at A9. An advisory opinion from
the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachuseus:however, in response to ques-
tions submitted by the Massachusetts Senate, made clear that the proposed civil union bill
still would violate the equal protection and due process clauses of the Massachusetts Con-
stitution. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569-72 (Mass. 2004). In
light of the opinion, the Massachusetts legislature passed an amendment to the constitu-
tion limiting marriage to a man and a woman and establishing civil unions. Massachusetts
law, however, requires re-enactment of the amendment by next year's legislature, followed
by voter ratification, so it cannot become effective prior to November 2006. Elizabeth Me-
hren, Last-Ditch Bid to Stop Gay Marriage, L.A. Times, Apr. 16, 2004, at A16.
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cities across the country, as mayors in San Francisco, California;
Benton County and Portland, Oregon; King County, Washington;
Sandoval County, New Mexico; and New Paltz, New York began issu-
ing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, some even while under
threat of prosecution for violating existing laws limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples.° Proponents of same-sex marriage also filed law-
suits in several of these states, challenging bans on same-sex marriage
as unconstitutional.
These dramatic changes in the rights and status of gays, particu-
larly in the area of family law, did not spring forth out of whole cloth.
In fact, a series of cases in the preceding decade laid the foundation for
these momentous decisions. In 1993, Hawaii became the first state to
declare the denial of a marriage license to two people of the same sex
unconstitutional.° In Baehr v. Lewin, the Hawaii Supreme Court held
that the petitioners, several same-sex couples wishing to marry but de-
nied a license by the state, had demonstrated that the marriage restric-
tion was facially unconstitutional gender discrimination under the Ha-
waii Constitution. On remand, the trial court ruled that the state had
failed to meet its burden of showing that the restriction limiting mar-
riage to opposite-sex couples was necessary to achieve any compelling
interest, thus paving the way for same-sex couples to marry.°
While the appeal of the trial court's ruling was pending, the Ha-
waii legislature responded by amending its constitution to limit mar-
6 Joshua Akers, N.M. Same-Sex Marriages off Again, Ai.BuQuEuquE J., Mar. 24, 2004, at
Al; David Austin, Issuing of Licenses Resumes, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), Mar. 16, 2004, at
Al, LEXIS, News Library, OREGNN File; Mark Larabee & Ashbel S. Green, Benton Approves
Gay Marriage, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), Mar. 17, 2004, at Al, LEXIS, News Library,
OREGNN File; Tom Precious, Mayor Is Charged over Gay Marriages, IlutTnio NEws, Mar. 3,
2004, at A8, 2004 WLNR 1615943; Lornet Turnbull et al., Marriage Licenses Denied; Gays
'fake County to Court: Sims Is Both Defendant, Supporter; Nickels Acts to Recognize Unions, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, at Al, 2004 WLNR 1791702.
7 Standhardt v. Superior Court es IA County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 453-54 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2003), review denied, No. CV-03-0422-PR, 2004 Ariz. LEXIS 62 (Ariz. May 25, 2004)
(unpublished opinion); Lewis v. Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114, at *1-2
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2003). See generally NAT'L CIR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHIS, MAR-
RIAGE, DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS, AND CIVIL UNIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF RELATIONSHIP
RECOGNITION FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES IN Tim UNITED STATES (2004) (discussing other




a Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67-68 (Haw.), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225
(Flaw. 1993).
9
 Baehr v, Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21-22 (Haw. Ct. App. Dec. 3,
1996), order aff'd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997).
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riage to members of the opposite sex. 10
 Consequently, no same-sex
couples ever had the opportunity to marry in Hawaii. Nonetheless,
the response to the Baehr cases was swift and emphatic: Congress
passed the federal Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") in 1996,
defining marriage for all federal laws, rules, and regulations as "a le-
gal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife"
and providing that no state need give effect to "a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of
such other State ... or a right or claim arising from such relation-
ship."" Further, approximately eighty percent of the states enacted a
variety of so-called "mini-DOMAs," statutes or constitutional amend-
ments which, at a minimum, declare marriage to be a union solely of
individuals of the opposite sex and refuse to recognize marriages be-
tween individuals of the same sex from other states. 12
Meanwhile, in 1999, in State v. Bahl; the Vermont Supreme Court
held that denying same-sex couples the benefits of marriage violated
the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution." The
court stopped short of requiring that same-sex couples be allowed to
marry and invited the legislature to devise an alternative system that
would provide the same benefits as marriage to same-sex couples. 14
" 1997 Haw, Sess. Laws 117.
" Pub. L. No. 104-199, §§ 2(a), 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996).
12 NEB. CoNsT. art. I, § 29; NEV. CONS1'. art. 1, § 21; ALA. ConE § 30-1-19 (1998); AtaksitA
STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 2002); ARIZ, REV, STAT. ANN. §§ 25-101(c), -112 (West 2000);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208 (Michie 2002); CAL. FAM, CODE § 308.5 (West 2004); COLO, REV.
STAT. § 14-2-104 (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101(a), (d) (1999); FLA. S1WF. ANN.
§ 741.212 (West Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2004); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-
1 (Michie 1999); IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (Michie 1996); 750 ILL. COMP, &FM'. ANN. 5/213.1
(West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (Michie 2003); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 595.2, .20
(West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-101, -115 (Stipp. 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 402.040,
.045 (Michie 1999); LA. Co.'. CODE ANN. arts. 89, 96 (West 1999); ME. Rev. STA•F. ANN. tit.
19-A, § 701 (West 1998); Micit. Come. LAWS §§ 551.271—.272 (Supp. 2004) (Mum. STAT.
ANN. §§ 25.15,16 (Michie Supp. 2000)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.03(a) (4), (b) (West Supp.
2004); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1(2) (2004); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.022 (West 2004); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-1-401 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1 to :3 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 51-1-2 (2003); N.D. CENT, CODE § 14-03-08 (2004); Onto REV, ConE ANN. § 3101.01 (West
Supp. 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 3, 3.1 (West 2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1704 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (LaW. Co-op. SUpp, 2003); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-1-38 (Michie Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (2001); Ti:x. FASt. Cons
ANN. § 6.204(c) (Vernon Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-2(5), 30-1-4(1) (1998); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 2004); WAstt. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.020 (West Supp. 2004);
W. VA. Cons ANN. § 48-2-603 (Michie 2001); SCE NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, AN•I-
GAY MARRIAGE MEASURES IN 11IE U.S. (2005), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/
downloads/marriagernap.pdf.
" 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
14 Id.
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The Vermont legislature responded by enacting the civil union stat-
ute, which allows same-sex couples to enter into a state-sanctioned
civil union—a status providing all the rights and privileges of mar-
riage under state law. 15
Although Vermont's civil union statute explicitly reaffirmed that
"'marriage' means the legally recognized union of one man and one
woman," it went significantly further than any other law up to that
time in granting same-sex couples the equivalent rights, benefits, and
responsibilities as married couples. 16 In the fall of 2003, California en-
acted a law nearly as comprehensive: the California Domestic Partner
Rights and Responsibilities Act, commonly referred to as A.B. 205. 17
These dramatic and far-reaching developments raise a host of
challenging legal questions involving the interpretation of the mean-
ing and scope of these laws within their home states and especially
their enforceability or recognition by other states. Although numer-
ous scholars have addressed the validity of the federal DOMA and the
choice of law dilemmas posed by same-sex marriage, courts only re-
cently have begun to grapple with whether the rights afforded by
Vermont's civil union statute will be recognized when the parties to
that union move to another state and seek enforcement there."' No
court has yet decided whether an actual marriage by two people of
15 VT. STAT. ANN, tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002).
16 1d. § 1201 (4).
" CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-299.6.
IS See generally Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 184 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002), appeal
granted in part, 806 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 2002); Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 48-49 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2002); Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 412 (App. Div. 2003); Barbara
J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-of-Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Am We Still Married When
We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1033; Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be
Recognized in Sister States? Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States' Choice of
Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr v.
Lewin, 32 U. Loutsvn.LE J. FAM. L. 551 (1994); Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Same-Sex Marriages
and the Defense of Marriage Act: A Deviant View of an Experiment in Full Faith and Credit, 32
CREIGIITON L. REV. 409 (1998); Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster: On
DOMA, Covenant Marriages, and Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence, 64 Mom. L. REV. 307
(1998); Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255 (1998); Note, Constitutional Constraints
on Interstate Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, 116 HARV. L. Rr.v. 2028 (2003) thereinafter Con-
stitutional Constraints]; Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional and Choice of
Law Arguments for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L. REV. 499 (1995); Christo-
pher D. Sawyer, Note, Practice What You Preach: California's Obligation to Give Full Faith and
Credit to the Vermont Civil Union, 59 HASTINGS U. 727 (2003).
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the same sex will be recognized outside of the state or country where
the marriage was performed.i°
Marriage and the alternative systems recently created for same-sex
couples provide extensive rights, benefits, and responsibilities for the
parties to those unions. In this Article, I am concerned with one subset
of those rights and responsibilities: those granting parental status to the
partner/spouse who is neither biologically related to nor an adoptive
parent of a child being raised by the couple. More specifically, this Arti-
cle will explore whether parental rights afforded by marriage or one of
these alternative systems will survive a move to another state which does
not explicitly provide for recognition of these relationships. 2°
Estimates of the number of children being raised by gay or les-
bian parents run from six million to fourteen million. 21 Demogra-
phers estimate that thirty-four percent of lesbian couples and twenty-
two percent of gay male couples are raising children. 22 Some of those
couples are raising children from prior marriages of one or both of
the partners, or children who were born or adopted by one partner
prior to beginning a relationship with the current partner. Others de-
cided jointly to become parents, either through adoption or by
artificial insemination for lesbian couples or surrogacy for gay men.
Undoubtedly, many same-sex couples with children, like their
heterosexual counterparts, will move one or more times during the
course of their relationship. Although awareness of the uncertainties
of enforcement of their marital or partnership rights might lead to
lesser mobility among this population, states can expect that at some
point in the not too distant future, partners from Vermont, California,
Massachusetts, and Canada will seek to enforce aspects of their part-
nership or marriage in the courts of other jurisdictions. Indeed, sev-
19
 One city, San Jose. California, has voted to recognize marriages of gay employees
who marry elsewhere, though a Christian legal group has filed suit to block the action.
Harriet Chiang, The Battle over Same-Sex Marriage: Group Sues San Jose to Stop Family Benefits,
S.F. CIIRON., May 14, 2004, at B3, 2004 WLNR 7629092.
" The only state to provide explicitly for recognition of rights granted to same-sex
partners by other states is California. Sec CAL. FAte. Cone §§ 297-299.6.
21 V.C. V. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13, 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (Wecker, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part), affil,  748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000); Danielle Epstein Sc
Lena Mukherjee, Note. Constitutional Analysis of the Barriers Same-Sex Couples Face in Their
Quest to Become a Family Unit, 12 ST. JOIIN'S J. LE CAL COMMENT. 782, 800 n.101 (1997); Sally
Jacobs, What Can Social Science Add to the Gay Marriage Debate? Not Much So Far, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 9, 2004, at Cl, 2004 WLNR 3565811.
" Charlene Gomes, The Need for Full Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage., HUMANIST,
Sept.—Oct. 2003, at 15, 16, available at http://www.thehumanist.org/humanist/articles/
GomesS003.pdf.
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eral appellate decisions have resulted already from efforts to gain in-
terstate recognition of a civil union since the statute was enacted in
2001. 23 No cases have been decided yet involving parental rights ac-
quired under these systems, but it. is inevitable that such cases will
arise. 24 How will the courts respond? How should they?
This Article seeks to answer both of these questions according to
state statutory and common law. The answers to these questions are of
the utmost importance for the partners in these relationships and for
the children being raised in these families. Parents who have loved,
nurtured, and supported their children are at risk of being stripped
of their parental rights should they move, and their children are at
risk of being completely cut off from a parent to whom they are
deeply attached and on whom they have depended. It is my hope that
this Article can serve as a resource and a blueprint for advocates who
will be litigating this issue in the future.
To assist us in our task, I have created the following hypothetical
to provide a framework for analyzing a state's obligation or ability to
recognize and to enforce parental rights provided to same-sex part-
ners through marriage or one of the alternative systems by another
state or country: Andrea and Sarah have been involved in a commit-
ted lesbian relationship for four years. They have lived together for
the past two years and have decided to start a family through the use
of artificial insemination. 25 The couple agrees that Andrea will be in-
seminated with sperm from an anonymous donor and bear the child.
They also agree that after a three-month maternity leave, Andrea will
return to work as an attorney, while Sarah, a nurse who makes consid-
erably less than Andrea, will quit her job and stay home to care for the
" See Baumgarten, 804 A.2d at 184; Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 49; Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
24 See Author's Note supra at *.
25 1am focusing on lesbian parents who conceive by artificial insemination for two rea-
sons. First, gay or lesbian couples who choose adoption in California, Massachusetts, or
Vermont almost certainly will complete the adoption jointly, because courts generally will
not approve an adoption by a married couple without both spouses' consent. See Mark
Strasser, Adoption, Best Interests, and the Constitution: On Rational Basis Scrutiny and the Avoid-
ance of Absurd Results, 5 J.L. & FAA'. S' run. 297, 314-15 (2003). Second, gay men who
choose to create a family through surrogacy likewise will usually need to go through an
adoption or other proceeding, as the non-biologically related parent would when a hetero-
sexual couple uses a surrogate. See In re Adoption of K.F.H. & K.F.H., 844 S.W.2d 343, 344-
45 (Ark. 1993) (finding surrogate mother's consent to adoption by child's father's wife
unnecessary because of failure to communicate with child): Adoption of Matthew B., 232
Cal. App. 3d 1239, 1251 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that surrogate not allowed to revoke
consent to adoption by wife of child's father); Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1301, 1317
(Conn. 1998) (finding wife of husband who conceived child with surrogate by artificial
insemination was not child's parent in the absence of adoption).
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baby. Prior to undergoing the insemination, Andrea and Sarah decide
to solemnize their relationship, as permitted by the jurisdiction in
which they live. Andrea ultimately becomes pregnant and gives birth
to a baby girl, Madeleine. When Madeleine is four, a new job oppor-
tunity for Andrea prompts the family to move to another jurisdiction.
One year later, Andrea and Sarah decide to end the relationship.
What legal rights, if any, would Sarah have to custody or visitation
with Madeleine under this scenario? In the pages that follow, I will
consider whether and how the answer to that question varies if An-
drea and Sarah originally solemnized their relationship by marrying
in Massachusetts or Canada or by entering into a civil union in Ver-
mont or registering as domestic partners in California under A.B. 205.
I begin, in Part I, by analyzing the nature of the parental rights af-
forded by each system to the non-biological parent—the parent in
Sarah's position, 28
 In Part II, I consider arguments for recognition of
those parental rights in other jurisdictions. 27
 I analyze first if Andrea
and Sarah have married in Massachusetts or Canada, beginning with
jurisdictions that have not enacted a DOMA and continuing with ju-
risdictions which have enacted DOMAs. 28
 I will argue that, although
parental rights likely can be secured in the non-DOMA jurisdictions
through recognition of the marriage, more creative lawyering will be
required in the DOMA jurisdictions. In these states, even if the courts
refuse to recognize the same-sex marriage, advocates for same-sex
parents nonetheless will be able to make a variety of arguments for
recognition of their parental rights, including application of the Uni-
form Parentage Act (the "UPA"), recognition of the "incident" of pa-
rental status, if not of the marriage itself, and reliance on precedents
governing choice of law in cases disputing legitimacy and more gen-
erally. I next discuss how the analysis would change if Andrea and
Sarah entered into a Vermont civil union or a California domestic
partnership, rather than marrying. 29
 In Part III, I consider opportuni-
ties and obstacles to seeking custody or visitation as a third party. 89
Filially, in Part IV, I suggest some strategic alternatives to solidify a
same-sex partner's parental rights. 31
28 Sec infra notes 32-78 and accompanying text.
27
 See infra notes 80-439 and accompanying text.
28 Sec infra notes 82-389 and accompanying text.
29 Sce infra notes 391-439 and accompanying text.
95 Sec infra notes 441-452 and accompanying text.
81 Sec infra notes 453-467 and accompanying text.
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I. PARENTAL RIGHTS FOR SAME-SEX PARTNERS
A. Under Marriage
1. Massachusetts
If Andrea and Sarah lived in Massachusetts and were to marry
there, Sarah would enjoy the same parental rights as a husband in her
position would. Massachusetts, like most states, provides that a hus-
band who consents to his wife's artificial insemination becomes for all
purposes, the father of any children resulting from the procedure."
Thus, Sarah would be considered Madeleine's legal parent and would
have a right to seek custody and visitation in the event of a divorce.
2. Canada
Canada applies a more expansive rule. A man who consents to
the artificial insemination of his wife or cohabiting partner is consid-
ered the legal father of any children born of the procedure." Thus, as
in Massachusetts, if Andrea and Sarah were to marry in Canada, Sarah
would be considered Madeline's legal parent.
B. Under the Domestic Partnership or Civil Union
Both California's A.B. 205 and Vermont's civil union statute grant
same-sex partners the same parental rights as spouses." Although
these provisions might seem at first glance to ensure that same-sex
partners enjoy equal rights to custody, visitation, and child support as
the biological parent, that assertion is open to interpretation, at least
in Vermont. These statutes do not provide more rights than the part-
ners would obtain were they married, and spouses who are not bio-
logically related to their children do not always enjoy rights equivalent
to those of the biological parent. As no cases have yet decided the
scope of parental rights under these statutes, we will need to consider
precedent from analogous areas of the law in each of these states,
namely statutes and cases concerning husbands who are not biologi-
cally related to the children born during the marriage.
32
 Mass. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 411 (2002).
33
 R.S.M. ch. V60, § 3(6) (1987) (Can.); NFLD. R.S. ch. G13, § 12 (1990) (Can.); S.Y.T.
ch. 31, § 13 (2002) (Can.).
" See CAL. Fiat. Coin § 297.5(d) (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f) (2002).
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1. California
The California Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act provides
that "[tj he rights and obligations of registered domestic partners with
respect to a child of either of them shall be the same as those of
spouses."35
 In California, as in Massachusetts, the rights of a spouse to a
child conceived by artificial insemination with the spouse's consent are
clear. Under section 7613 of the California Family Code, a husband
who consents to the artificial insemination of his wife with donor se-
men under the supervision of a licensed physician is treated in law as if
he was the natural father." Thus, if Andrea and Sarah lived in Califor-
nia and registered as domestic partners under A.B. 205, Sarah could be
assured of full parental rights as long as she and Andrea complied with
the statute by using a physician to perform the insemination. 37
2. Vermont
The rights of a same-sex parent in Sarah's position are less clear if
she and Andrea lived in Vermont and entered into a civil union there.
The civil union statute provides as follows:
The rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child
of whom either becomes the natural parent during the term
of the civil union, shall be the same as those of a married
couple, with respect to a child of whom either spouse be-
comes the natural parent during the marriage."
Unfortunately, Vermont has no statute defining the parental rights of
a spouse when the wife is artificially inseminated. It seems likely that if
a court faced a custody or visitation dispute between parties to a civil
union, it would follow the lead of the many other states which have
adopted the rule making the husband the legal father where the wife
was artificially inseminated. 39 Many of those states have statutes estab-
35 CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d).
S6 CAL. FAM, CODE § 7613(a); see In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282
(Ct. App. 1998) (holding that wife who consented to implantation of embryo created with
donated egg and sperm in surrogate is treated as natural parent based on artificial insemi-
nation statute).
ihordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 531 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that failure
to use physician for artificial insemination, as required by statute, meant a sperm donor
had standing in a paternity action).
66 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f).
" Note, Changing Realities of Parenthood: The Law's Response to the Evolving American Fam-
ily and Emerging Reproductive Technologies, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2052, 2066-68 (2003).
2004]	 Intetstate Recognition of Same-Sex Parents
	 11
,fishing the rights and responsibilities of the husband; others have
reached a similar result through case law, relying on public policy or
estoppel principles. 40
 Indeed, courts have imposed child support ob-
ligations on former husbands who did not consent in writing to the
procedure during the marriage, even though a statute required it. 41
In the absence of clear authority, however, advocates should be
prepared to argue in favor of full parental rights based on existing
statutory authority. Section 308(4) of title 15 of Vermont's domestic
relations statute provides that a person is "rebuttably presumed to be
the natural parent" if the child is born while the husband and wife are
married.42
 Since parties to a civil union enjoy the same rights as mar-
ried persons in Vermont, Sarah would enjoy a rebuttable presumption
that she is Madeleine's parent. The question, of course, remains: un-
der what circumstances could that presumption be rebutted?
Vermont has relatively scant authority dealing with challenges to
claims of parental status by spouses who are not biologically related to
their children. Statutes allowing for an action to be brought by various
parties to establish parentage and to determine paternity through ge-
netic testing suggest that a negative finding by a paternity test could
rebut the presumption provided by section 308 of title 15 of the Ver-
mont statutes.°
Case law implicitly supports the notion that the marital presump-
tion of paternity can be rebutted by evidence demonstrating that the
husband is not the biological father of the child. In 2001, in Jones v.
40 Sec Michael J. Yaworsky, Annotation, Rights and Obligations Resulting from Human
Artificial Insemination, 83 A.L.R. 9th 295, 301 (1991). Michael J. Yaworsky stated the follow-
ing:
Generally speaking, a husband who consents to the artificial insemination
of his wife using sperm from a third-party donor is treated in law as the father
of any child born as a result of the insemination, for all purposes. Where this
result is not dictated by statute, it has been said to arise by reason of public
policy or the principles of equitable or promissory estoppel.
Id.: scc 59 Abn. Jou. 2n Parent Co' Child § 5 (2002).
" See, e.g., R.S. v. R.S., 670 P.2d 923, 926-28 (Ran. Ct. App. 1983); K.B. v. N.B., 811 S.W.2d
634, 636, 639 (Tex. App. 1991); cf. Lane v. Lane, 912 P.2d 290, 292, 296 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996)
(recognizing former husband as father with right to custody based on conduct and recita-
tions in pleadings, even though no written consent provided prior to insemination).
W. STAT. ANN. tit. I5 , § 308(4).
43 Sec id. § 293 (allowing party to a support action to challenge the presumption of le-
gal parentage provided by § 308); id. § 302 (permitting actions to establish parentage); id.
§ 304 (allowing motion to require genetic testing); cf. id. § 308(1) (noting that the rebut-
table presumption remains if the alleged parent does not submit to genetic testing without
good cause if ordered).
12
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Murphy, the Vermont Supreme Court considered a challenge to a
court order assigning paternity to the biological fatherof a child born
to a woman married to another man." The couple's divorce order
had named the husband and wife as the child's parents.45
 A stipula-
tion entered into shortly thereafter stated that blood tests showed
unequivocally that the husband could not have fathered the child. 46
The mother filed a paternity action against the biological father,
Richard Murphy, the next day, but did not move to amend the divorce
judgment until the time for doing so (the nisi period) already had
expired.47
 The trial court nonetheless amended the divorce decree
and found that Murphy was the child's father. 48 Murphy appealed,
and the Vermont Supreme Court reversed, finding that the trial court
had erroneously issued two conflicting rulings regarding paternity,
because the decree was not amended in a timely fashion. 49 The
court's decision implies, however, that had the motion to amend the
divorce order been brought within the nisi period, it would have been
granted and the husband would have been relieved of all his parental
rights and responsibilities."
Although the Jones court reversed the declaration of parentage
against the biological father because of the conflicting divorce decree,
it took pains to distinguish an earlier case." In Godin a Godin, the court
refused to allow a former husband to re-open a divorce decree many
years later, upon learning that lie was not the biological father of the
child he had believed to be his daughter. 52 The Godin court affirmed
the trial court's order finding that the divorce decree was res judicala,





49 Jones, 772 A.2d at 504, 506.
5° See id. at 506-07 (Dooley, J., concurring). justice John A. Dooley stated the following
in his concurrence:
The mother of the child now has the virtually unfettered choice whether to
obtain child support from the biological father or her former husband
If, for example, the mother decides that her former husband's demands for
visitation are unacceptable, she can disclose that he is not the biological fa-
ther and bring a paternity action .... I suspect that a stipulated relief from
the divorce judgment will be granted as a matter or course if there is an out-
standing parentage order against the biological father.
Id. (Dooley, J., concurring).
51 Id. at 505-06.
52
 725 A.2d 904, 905 (Vt. 1998).
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rejecting the ex-husband's argument that the wife, who knew another
man was the biological father, had perpetrated a fraud on the court.°
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied substantially on "fimda-
mental policy concerns that require finality of paternity adjudications,"
specifically, the rebuttable presumption of parentage established by
section 308 of title 15 of the Vermont statutes." The court rooted sec-
tion 308 of title 15 of the Vermont. statutes in the conclusive presump-
tion of paternity, a long-standing doctrine holding that a child is con-
clusively presumed to be the child of the marriage unless the husband
was physically incapable of fathering the child. 55 The court described
the presumption as "'one of the strongest and most persuasive known
to the law.'"56 The court combined by enumerating several modern-day
policies supporting adherence to the presumption, including protect-
ing children from illegitimacy, preserving their emotional and financial
security, and maintaining the stability of the family unit as well as "the
continuity ... and psychological security of an established parent-child
relationship."57 The court described the state's interest in ensuring the
financial and emotional well-being of children by preserving this par-
ent-child relationship as "direct and strong" and declared that "it must
remain paramount."58
 In the court's view, it was "readily apparent. that a
parent-child relationship was formed, and it is that relationship, and
not the results of a genetic test, that must control." 59 Moreover, the
court acknowledged that these concerns take on even greater
significance today "as family structures become more fluid and the
means of conception become ever more varied. " 60
As Justice John A. Dooley pointed out in his dissent, however, sec-
tion 308 of title 15 of the Vermont statutes is a rebuttable presumption
which operates "only to assign the burden of production."° 1
 Once a
party presents evidence rebutting the presumption—that the parent
in question is not biologically related to the child—the presumption
ceases to have effect, and the trier of fact must determine the fact at
55
 Id. at 905-06.
54 Id. at 909; see VT, STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 308 (2002).
as Godin, 725 A.2d at 909; see VT. STA•. ANN. tit. 15, § 308.
Godin, 725 A.2d at 909 (quoting Richard B. v. Sandra B.B., 625 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129
(App. Div. 1995)).
57
 Id. at 909-10.
58
 Id, at 910.
59 Id. at 911.
65 Id. at 912.
Godin, 725 A.2d at 915 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
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issue based on the evidence rather than the presumption." Justice
Dooley disagreed with the majority's policy analysis as well. In his view,
the majority's approach perpetuated a legal fiction in place of the bio-
logical reality which "results in a host of inequities for the child, the
presumptive father (the husband), and the alleged father."63 He also
was concerned that the majority's approach rewarded the mother for
her fraudulent behavior." Nor did he see the need to protect the fam-
ily unit when the marriage had been dissolved many years earlier.°
Although the Godin case would not be directly controlling in our
hypothetical, the majority's reasoning lends strong support to Sarah's
claims under the civil union.° The policies of ensuring financial and
psychological security for the child apply equally in our case and in-
deed are arguably stronger here. In our hypothetical, Andrea and
Sarah conceived the child by artificial insemination with sperm from
an anonymous donor. Consequently, if the non-biological parent's
status is challenged successfully, the child will be left with one parent
without recourse to support from another biological parent. 67 Nor do
Justice Dooley's objections undercut Sarah's argument. Although he
may have a point about the typical functioning of the rebuttable pre-
sumption (though not one that garnered support of the majority in
Godin), section 308 of the Vermont statutes contains references to the
accuracy of genetic testing and clearly is designed to address the prob-
lem of uncertain paternity.° Likewise his policy concerns do not ap-
ply in the case of same-sex partners—no fraud is being perpetrated,
no legal fiction substituted for a biological reality. The child is not be-
ing deprived of the right to know her "true" parent. All parties know
that one parent is not biologically related.
62 Id. at 915 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
63 /d. at 915-16 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 916 (Dooley, J., dissenting),
66 Id. (Dooley, J., dissenting).
6° See Godin, 725 A.2d at 909-10.
67 Sec id. at 911 n.3. The court made the following observation:
This is not a case where a third party is seeking to establish paternity and
assume support of the child, or where support is being sought from a third-
party putative father. A finding of nonpaternity in this case would essentially
leave the child without the benefit of a father-child relationship, and the eco-
nomic and emotional well-being that accompanies it.
hi. Anonymous sperm donors typically retain no parental rights or responsibilities. Yawor-
sky, supra note 40, at 320-21.
68 Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 308 (1), (3) (2002) (requiring only ninety-eight percent
probability of parentage through genetic testing).
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Thus, although the language of section 308 and the ability of a
husband to contest his paternity under certain circumstances might
suggest that the presumption in favor of Sarah's parentage could be
rebutted merely by proving she was not the biological parent of
Madeleine, such a result would be strikingly at odds with the underly-
ing purposes of section 308 and the civil union statute. Because same-
sex partners, in most instances, would not both be biologically related
to the child, allowing the biological partner to rebut the presumption
of parentage for the non-biological parent would make the parental
rights granted by the civil union statute largely illusory, at least in dis-
putes between the partners. 69
It seems highly doubtful that the legislature intended such an
outcome." The words of the Vermont Supreme Court in Adoptions of
B.L.V13. & E.L.V.B. apply equally here: "[t]o deny the children of
same-sex partners, as a class, the security of a legally recognized rela-
tionship with their second parent serves no legitimate state interest." 71
Either section 308, as applied to parties to a civil union, requires giv-
ing conclusive effect to the presumption of parentage, or the court
should follow the general rule regarding children born of married
women by artificial insemination.
In the very unlikely event that a court denied full parental status
to Sarah, at a minimum, she would have rights equivalent to those of a
stepparent. Unfortunately, a stepparent's right to custody or visitation
appears quite limited under Vermont law. Section 293 of title 15 of
the Vermont statutes allows stepparents living separately to petition
the court for a decree regarding parental rights, responsibilities, and
contact, but that provision as of yet has not been interpreted to pro-
69 Some lesbian couples are taking advantage of assisted reproductive techniques to
ensure that each partner has a biological tie to the child. One partner provides the egg,
which is fertilized in vitro and then implanted in the other partner, who carries the fetus to
term and gives birth to the child. NA•'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LEGAL REcooNrrioN
or LGIIT FAMILIES 5-6 (2002), available at http://www.nclrights.org/publications/pubs/
Igbtfainilies092402.pdf; Ryiah Lilith, Student Author, The GIFT of Two Biological and Legal
Mothers, 9 Am. U. J. GENDER SOC. POO? & L. 207, 209-10, 216-17 (2001); cf. K.M. v. E.G.,
13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 139 (Ct. App. 2004), superseded by 97 P.3d 72 (Cal. 2004) (finding les-
bian who donated egg to partner was donor, not parent, because both intended only part-
ner who gave birth to be legal parent).
7° See Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1274 (Vt. 1993) (describing
Lubinsky v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd., 527 A.2d 227, 228 (Vt. 1986)) (noting that Lubinsky
holds that the "intent of [a] statute is derived from consideration not only of language, but
from [the] entire enactment, its reason, purpose and consequence, and on presumption
that no unjust or unreasonable result was intended").
a Id. at 1275.
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vide a right to visitation by a stepparent once the marriage is dis-
solved." Dicta in a case rejecting a pre-civil union claim by a lesbian
to visitation with her partner's adopted child is ambiguous at best." In
Paquette v. Paquette, the Vermont Supreme Court did consider the abil-
ity of a stepparent to seek custody of his stepson in a divorce. 74 The
court first found that section 293 gave the court the power to award
custody to a stepparent while the parties were still married under cer-
tain circumstances." The court next interpreted a provision of Ver-
mont's child custody statute, section 652 of title 15 of the Vermont
statutes, to allow a stepparent to petition for custody in a divorce pro-
ceeding, but only under limited circumstances." In deference to the
parent's fundamental constitutional right to custody, and the con-
comitant presumption that custody with the parent is in the best in-
terests of the child, the court concluded that a stepparent could ob-
tain custody only if he or she acted in loco parentis to the child and
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that either the parent
was unfit or that extraordinary circumstances justified the award of
custody in the best interests of the child." If Paquette allows a steppar-
ent to seek custody in a divorce, albeit under limited circumstances,
surely a petition for visitation could be filed. We can expect, however,
that the stepparent seeking visitation would have to make a similar
showing to justify awarding visitation over the objections of a parent."
In summary, as long as Andrea and Sarah remain in their home
state or country—whether Massachusetts, Canada, Vermont, or Cali-
fornia—Sarah likely will be able to seek custody and/or visitation with
Madeleine on an equal footing with Andrea. Although there are ad-
mittedly some vulnerabilities in Sarah's position in Vermont, the bet-
72 Vt. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 293.
73
 Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 685, 687 (Vt. 1997) (noting that visitation rights
were limited to married biological parents until legislature enacted grandparent statute,
but also citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 293, granting stepparents, among others, the right
to petition family court regarding parental rights and responsibilities).
74 499 A.2d 23, 25 (Vt. 1985).
75 Id. at 25-26; see VT. STAT. ANN. at. 15, § 293.
75 Paquette, 499 A.2d at 29-30; see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 652.
Paquette, 499 A.2d at 29-30.
78 Although one commentator suggests that a best interests showing would be sufficient,
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Thud ta. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), likely compels a
higher standard, similar to the Paquette standard, regardless of a state's prior precedents. See
Jill Jourdan, The Effects of Civil Unions on Vinnont Children, Vi. B.J., Mar. 28, 2002, at 32, 34,
available at http://www.vtbar.mVerstatic/data/vtbar/journal/mar_2002/jourdan,pdf (sup-
porting sufficiency of best interests showing); infra notes 441-452 and accompanying text
(discussing third-party claims for custody or visitation).
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ter interpretation of the civil union statute would recognize her as a
legal parent. In California, the result seems certain. In the next Part, I
explore the portability of these parental rights. 79 What happens to
Sarah's parental rights if Andrea and Sarah moved out of state when
Madeleine was four?
II. RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERS' PARENTAL RIGHTS IN
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The most obvious way to frame the question regarding the valid-
ity of Sarah's parental rights in other jurisdictions is to ask whether
the marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership will be recognized
in the new state. But while the question may be straightforward, the
answer is anything but. Interstate recognition of same-sex marriages,
civil unions, and domestic partnerships arguably implicates the scope
and meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution;
the scope, meaning, and constitutionality of the federal DOMA; and
the scope, meaning, and constitutionality of a patchwork of mini-
DOMAs of varying types, all laid on top of a plethora of common law
and statutory principles used by individual states to determine choice
of law questions. In short, there is a complete lack of uniformity and
the trend appears to be moving toward increasing diversity, as some
states seek to equalize the family law rights of gays and lesbians and
other states react with backlash toward that progress. Numerous
scholars already have begun to address many of the questions sur-
rounding interstate recognition of same-sex marriages, unions, and
domestic partnerships, with no consensus on the answers or the rea-
soning supporting the answers. 80 Other observers have remarked that
79 See infra notes 80-439 and accompanying text.
a° Compare generally Strasser, supra note 18 (arguing that DOMA is unconstitutional un-
der the Full Faith and Credit Clause and states must recognize same-sex marriages), with
Whitten, supra note 18 (arguing that DOMA not unconstitutional under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause). See generally Cox, supra note 18 (exploring the choice of law questions arising
in litigation over the validity of same-sex marriages upon return to the state of domicile);
Henson, supra note 18 (arguing that the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses
require recognition of at least the incidents of marriage and that the public policy excep-
tions in choice of law cases should be narrowed); Rensberger, supra note 18; Constitutional
Constraints, supra note 18 (providing a survey of the debate over constitutional constraints
on refusals to recogniie same-sex marriages); Keane, supra note 18 (arguing that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, the right of interstate travel, the fundamental interest in marriage,
and conflict of law policies favor recognition of same-sex marriages in foreign states); Saw-
yer, supra note 18 (arguing that California policy requires recognition of the benefits
granted to those who enter into a Vermont civil union).
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"chaos" is likely to ensue once parties to these relationships attempt to
enforce them elsewhere. 81
I do not aspire in this Article to provide a comprehensive analysis
of all of the questions raised by the advent of same-sex marriage and
the alternative regimes, nor any conclusive answers regarding the
question of interstate recognition of same-sex marriages, civil unions,
or domestic partnerships generally. Rather, I focus in the following
Section specifically on the issue of recognition of the parental rights of
a same-sex partner like Sarah under statutory and common law prin-
ciples, and I move beyond the arguments premised on rules govern-
ing interstate recognition of marriages.
A. Recognition of Parental Rights if the Couple Marries in
Massachusetts or Canada
The validity of a marriage contracted in another state or country
traditionally has been governed by the rule of lex loci—a marriage that
is valid where it was performed will be held valid everywhere. 82 A strong
presumption in favor of recognizing marriages exists, and many states
have statutes codifying the rule. 83 However, under the general conflicts
rule of lex loci, the forum state may choose not to recognize such a mar-
riage if it would offend the strong public policy of the forum state or, in
some cases, if it was an evasionary marriage. 84 In an evasionary mar-
riage, the parties purposely marry in a state other than the one in
which they live to avoid a prohibition on the marriage in their home
state. They then return and resume residence in the home state. Sarah
al See, e.g., Kathleen Burge, For Gays, Divorce May Soon Be a Useful Right, BosToN GLony,
Dec. 3, 2003, at El. One commentator made the following observation:
"I think all hell is going to break loose when states have to begin to deal with
the process of gay divorce," said John Mayoue, an Atlanta lawyer who has writ-
ten extensively on same-sex unions. "I really think this is where the fight is go-
ing to come, and it's going to be chaos.*
Id. at 86; see David Crary, State-by-State Battle on Gay Marriage To Be Complex, Nasty, SAN DI-
Eno UNION-Tata„ Nov, 28, 2003, at A21, 2003 WLNR 13951072 (quoting Mark Strasser of
Capital University law School as silting, "All of this will be a mess").
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971); RE STATEMENT' OF
CONFLICT or LAWS §§ 121, 129 (1934); Henson, supra note 18, at 560-61 n.32; 52 &L ion.
2n Marriages 69 (2000).
as See Cox, supra note 18, at 1064-74.
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2); RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 121, 129; Cox, supra note 18, at 1067-68, 1074-82 (discussing eva-
sionary marriage statutes); Henson, supra note 18, at 560-61 & n.32; 52 Am. Jun. 2n Mar-
riage, supra note 82, §§ 63-64.
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and Andrea's marriage qualifies as a migratory marriage, rather than
an evasionary marriage, because the parties married or registered as
partners in the state in which they were then domiciled and intended
to remain.85
The public policy exception obviously presents the biggest hurdle
to achieving recognition of the marriage outside of Massachusetts or
Canada. The widespread adoption of state DOMAs compounds the
problem.88 These laws fall into roughly three categories: (1) laws pro-
hibiting same-sex marriage and denying recognition to same-sex mar-
riages validly contracted in other states (hereinafter "category one");87
(2) laws that go beyond category one to explicitly deny recognition of
any claim for a right, benefit, or responsibility based on the Marriage
(hereinafter "category two"); 88
 and (3) so-called "super-DOMAs," which
not only deny recognition of all of the above, but expressly prohibit
recognition of benefits provided by alternate marriage regimes such as
civil unions or domestic partnerships. 88
 These laws would seem at first
85 See Constitutional Constraints, supra note 18, at 2038.
88
 The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force identifies thirty-nine states that have
adopted anti-same-sex marriage laws as of June 2004. NA•'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE,
supra note 12.
87 NEv. CONSI-. art. 1, § 21; ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-
101(c), -112 (West 2000); CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2004); Coto. REv. STAT. § 14-2-
104 (2003); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101(a), (d) (1999); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN, § 572-1
(Michie 1999); InAtio ConE § 32-209 (Michie 1996); 750 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 5/213.1
(West 1999); IND. CODE A. § 31-11-1-1 (Michie 2003); !own CODE ANN. §§ 595.2, .20
(West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-101,415 (Supp. 2003); ME. Rim STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A,
§ 701 (West 1998); kiwi'. COMP. LAWS §§ 551.271—.272 (Supp. 2004) (Micti. STAT. ANN.
§§ 25.15—.16 (Michie Supp. 2000)); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1(2) (2004); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-1-401 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1-2 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-08
(2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN, tit. 43, §§ 3, 3.1 (West 2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704
(West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 254.38 (Michie Stipp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (2001); U•IAll CODE ANN.
§§ 30-1-2(5), 30-1-4(1) (1998); WASH. REV, CODE ANN. § 26.04.020 (West Supp. 2004).
88
 ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 2002); ARK. ConE ANN. § 9-11-208 (Michie 2002);
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2004); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.045 (Michie 1999); LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. arts. 89, 96 (West 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 5I7.03(a) (4), (b) (West Supp.
2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.022(4) (West 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 2004);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-603 (Michie 2001).
88
 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West Supp. 2004); Onto REV.
CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (West Supp. 2005); Tex. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204(c) (Vernon Supp.
2004); see SEAN CAHILL & SAM SLATER, NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE POLICY INST.,
MARRIAGE: LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN 8 (2004), available at http://
www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/tnarriagebrief.pdf. Montana may fall within this cate-
gory. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401. Its DOMA provides that same-sex marriages are
prohibited and that la] contractual relationship entered into for the purpose of achieving
a civil relationship that is prohibited ... is void as against public policy." Id. § 40-1-401(4).
It is unclear whether a civil union or domestic partnership would constitute a "contractual
20
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glance to resolve the question at hand in all but the nine jurisdictions
(other than Vermont. or Massachusetts) which do not have a DOMA.
However there are a number of bases for challenging that conclusion
in Sarah's case, as we will see later." We begin, though, by considering
arguments Sarah might raise in the states without a DOMA.
1. Recognition of Parental Rights in Non-DOMA Jurisdictions
The jurisdictions currently without any statutory provisions deny-
ing recognition to same-sex marriages contracted elsewhere or declar-
ing such marriages against public policy include Connecticut, Mary-
land, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Wisconsin,
Wyoming, and the District of Columbia 9 1 These jurisdictions follow
the general conflicts rule regarding marriages stated above, with some
variations, so a same-sex partner seeking parental rights after the rela-
tionship has ended will argue that the forum jurisdiction should rec-
ognize the marriage because the marriage is neither against public
policy nor an attempt to evade the forum's laws. 92
Sarah would have strong arguments to make in favor of recogni-
tion of the marriage in each of these jurisdictions. As a general matter,
a court considering whether an out-of-state marriage violates the forum
state's public policy begins by recognizing that a strong presumption
exists in favor of validating marriages.93
 Next, the court likely will exam-
relationship" entered into to achieve a same-sex marriage. The timing of the amendment
argues against this interpretation, because it was adopted in 1997, three years before Ver-
mont enacted its civil union statute.
9° See infra notes 128-389 and accompanying text.
91 See NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, supra note 12. Massachusetts and Vermont
also fall within this category. In this Section, however, Sarah is seeking to have her Massa-
chusetts marriage recognized elsewhere. Because Vermont allows civil unions, and, unlike
California, has no contradictory DOMA ostensibly prohibiting recognition of same-sex
marriages contracted elsewhere, Vermont undoubtedly would recognize the rights af-
forded by the Massachusetts marriage.
92 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-4 (Michie 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 106.210 (2003); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 20-1-111 (Michie 2003); Fattibene v. Fattibene, 441 A.2d 3, 5 (Conn. 1981),
Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 728 (Conn. 1961); Hudson Trail Outfitters v. District
of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 801 A.2d 987, 989 (D.C. 2002); Henderson v.
Henderson, 87 A.2d 403, 408 (Md. 1952); Sirois v. Sirois, 50 A.2d 88, 89 (N.H. 1946); Wil-
kins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65, 68 (N.J. 1958); Bucca v. State, 128 A.2d 506, 508 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1957); Leszinske v. Poole, 798 P.2d 1049, 1055 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990);
Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 414 (App. Div. 2003); Garrett v. Chapman,
449 P.2d 856, 858 (Or. 1969); In is Campbell's Estate, 51 N.W.2d 709, 712 (Wis. 1952);
Hoagland V. Hoagland, 193 P. 843, 844 (Wyo. 1920).
93 See Franklin v. Lee, 62 N.E. 78, 83 (Ind. App. 1901) (noting that the "presumption in
favor of marriage ... is one of the strongest known to the law"); RESTATEMENT (SEcoNo)
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ine related legislation and judicial decisions to ascertain the forum
state's policy toward same-sex marriages. In Sarah's favor, each of these
states has laws banning discrimination based on sexual orientation. 94
New Jersey and the District of Columbia have adopted domestic part-
nership ordinances which, although not as comprehensive as Ver-
mont's or California's ordinances, provide gay and lesbian partners
substantive legal benefits including rights to healthcare benefits and, in
New Jersey, additional rights to pensions, insurance, and certain tax
benefits comparable to those enjoyed by spouses, among others. 95
New York has extended rights to same-sex partners through judi-
cial decisions. 96 Indeed, New York was the first state to recognize a
partner in a Vermont civil union as a "spouse" for purposes of suing
for wrongful death in New York in Langan v. St. Vincent's Hospita197 In
doing so, the Langan court relied on precisely these kinds of statutory
pronouncements. 98 The court bolstered its decision by citing laws
prohibiting discrimination against gays and lesbians in employment,
education, and housing, and including same-sex partners among
those entitled to compensation from the September 11, 2001, victim
compensation fund 99 It also relied on a landmark decision by the
New York Court of Appeals which recognized a long-term, same-sex
partner as "family" for purposes of the New York City rent control or-
dinance. 199 In addition, the court relied on In re Jacob, a decision al-
lowing second parent adoptions by same-sex partners, even though
Or CoNtLicr or LAWS § 283 cmt. h (1971); Cox, supra note 18, at 1098; sce also Andrew
Koppelmatt, Same-Sex Marriage and Public Policy: The Miscegenation Precedents, 16 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 105, 126 (1996) (discussing cases in which the policy of preserving existing mar-
riages overrode the policy against [racial] intermarriage").
94 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§46a-81b to -81n, -81p to -81q (West 2004); Mn. ANN. Cons
art. 99B, §§ 8, 16, 22 (Stipp. 2002); MASS. Gm. LAWS ANN. Cll. 1518, § 3 (West 2004); N.H.
REV. SIAl. ANN, § 354-A:6 (Supp. 2004); N.J. S•AT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2002); N.Y. Cm
Rlrtrrs LAW § 40-C (McKinney Stipp. 2004); N.Y. EXEC. Lnw § 291 (McKinney Supp. 2004);
OR. REV. STAT. § 659.030 (2003); Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 441-42 (Or.
Ct. App. 1998); NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, GLEIT Ova. Ruarrs LAWS IN THE U.S.
(2003), available at Intp://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/civilrightsmap.pdf.
9' D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-701-706 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:8A-2, -4, -6, -12 (West
Stipp. 2004).
945 Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2t1 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989) (recognizing partner as
"family" for purposes of rent control ordinance); Slattery v. City of New York, 697 N.Y.S.2d
603, 605 (App. Div. 1999), appeal dismissed for lack of substantial constitutional question, 727
N.E.2d 1253 (N.Y. 2000), appeal dismissed, 734 N.E.2d 1208 (N.Y. 2000).
97 765 N.Y.S.2d at 420-22.
98 Id. at 415-1G, 420-21.
99 Id. at 415-16.
100 Id. at 415 (citing Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 55).
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the adoption statute, if read literally, would have required the biologi-
cal parent to relinquish all parental rights. 101
Jacob should carry particular weight in Sarah's case, because it
directly reflects the state's policy toward same-sex parenting.m There,
the court found that permitting a same-sex partner to adopt her part-
ner's biological child would further the purpose behind the New York
adoption statutes—to foster the child's best interests—by allowing
"the two adults who actually function as [the] child's parents to be-
come the child's legal parents.“ 1 " Likewise, in our hypothetical case,
recognizing the marriage from Massachusetts or Canada would en-
sure that Madeleine would not be cut off from one of her parents.
Andrea might counter that Alison D. u. Virginia M. argues against
recognition of the marriage.'" In Alison D., the New York Court of
Appeals found a lesbian co-parent lacked standing under section 70
of the New York Domestic Relations Law to seek visitation. 10
 However,
the court's unwillingness to give a broad reading to this statute seems
insufficient to overcome the other precedent and statutory authority
favoring recognition of the marriage. Moreover, the Alison D. court's
concern with unleashing unfettered judicial discretion to recognize
claims by individuals who had acted in a parental capacity would not
be implicated by validation of the marriage.
A number of other states in this category also have extended rights
related to parenting to same-sex partners. Like New York, both Con-
necticut and New Jersey allow second-parent adoptions by same-sex
partners.IN Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode
Island, and Wisconsin also have granted rights to same-sex partners
who have co-parented children in the absence of an adoption." 1
101 Id. at 416 (citing In reJacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y 1995)).
102 See 660 N.E.2d at 399.
1°3 Id.
1 " See generally 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
1°5 Id. at 29.
t°°
	 re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2(1 535, 541 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1995); In re Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 555 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1993); see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-727a (West 2004).
11(}7 See Laspina-Williams v. Laspina-Williams, 742 A.2d 840, 844 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)
(holding that lesbian co-parent had standing to petition for visitation); S.F. v. M.D., 751
A.2d 9, 15 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (ruling that lesbian co-parent had standing to peti-
tion for visitation); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 550 (N.J. 2000), affil, 748 A.2d 539 (N.J.
2000) (finding that lesbian co-parent had standing to seek joint legal custody and visita-
tion); A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 662 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (ruling that lesbian co-parent
had colorable claim of standing to seek right to maintain some type of continuing rela-
tionship with child); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 977 (R.I. 2000) (holding that les-
bian co-parent had standing to seek enforcement of visitation agreement); In re Custody of
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Although the law strongly supports recognition of the marriage in
most of these states, achieving marital recognition in Connecticut and
Maryland could prove more difficult. These states have statutory lan-
guage undercutting the claim for same-sex marriage recognition. Mary-
land's public accommodations statute, which prohibits discrimination
based upon sexual orientation, specifically states that the act "may not
be construed to authorize or validate a marriage between two individu-
als of the same sex." 108 Likewise, Connecticut's anti-discrimination stat-
ute provides that nothing in those sections be construed "to authorize
the recognition of or the right of marriage between persons of the
same sex."109 Maryland defines marriage as a union of a man and a
woman, 11 ° and Connecticut expressly states that "the current public
policy of the state ... is now limited to a marriage between a man and a
woman."' I 1
These statutes might well mean merely that courts cannot use
these laws to find a right to same-sex marriage within Maryland or
Connecticut, as the Vermont Supreme Court did in Balm; however,
legislative history and case law in Connecticut have persuaded one
court of a broader interpretation. 112 In Rosengarlen v. Downes, the
Connecticut Appellate Court considered a petition by a party to a
Vermont civil union to dissolve the relationship." 3
 The lower court
denied the petition, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction because
the petition did not involve a marriage or a "matter relating to family
1-1.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435 (Wis. 1995) (recognizing that lesbian co-parent had stand-
ing to seek to establish mother-child relationship and to obtain visitation); cf. Gestl v. Fre-
derick, 754 A.2d 1087, 1103 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (finding that Maryland court had
jurisdiction, as opposed to Tennessee court, because lesbian co-parent could obtain cus-
tody in Maryland by showing extraordinary circumstances); Barnae r. Barnae, 943 P.2d
1036, 1041 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that New Mexico was convenient forum for
hearing lesbian co-parent's claim to custody and timesharing).
Indeed, in these jurisdictions, Sarah would appear to have standing to seek visitation
with Madeleine, regardless of whether she and Andrea had married in Massachusetts or
Canada, because she acted as a de facto parent or in Tara parentis to Madeleine and because
the marriage, whether valid or not, arguably represents an agreement between the parties
that Sarah obtain parental rights. These precedents, however, do not obviate the need for
recognition of rights flowing from the Marriage because even these states may not con-
sider the non-biological parent on an equal footing with the biological parent. See infra
notes 453-467 and accompanying text.
108 Mn. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 5 (1998).
109 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-8lr (West 2004).
"a Mn. Cone ANN., FASt. LAW § 2-201 (1999).
'I' CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-727a.
112 Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 177-78, 180-83 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002), ap-
peal granted in part, 806 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 2002).
1 " Id. at 172.
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relations." In affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate
court cited legislative history behind a change in the state's adoption
statutes, which evidenced a concern that allowing same-sex adoption
might lead a Connecticut court to require civil unions, as permitting
such adoptions had in Vermont. 115 This background supports an in-
terpretation that still would not necessarily preclude recognition of an
out-of-state same-sex marriage. The court found other legislative his-
tory, however, that works against recognition." 6 Debate on the adop-
tion bill suggested that the legislature refrained from enacting a
DOMA because legislators believed it was unnecessary given the
statements contained in these statutes. 137
Precedents regarding validation of out-of-state marriages in Con-
necticut and Maryland are inconclusive. Although Connecticut courts
have invalidated an out-of-state marriage between an uncle and a
niece and a bigamous marriage, both of those kinds of marriages in-
volved conduct which was criminalna Moreover, Maryland has vali-
dated an uncle-niece marriage.to Both jurisdictions have recognized
common law marriages entered into elsewhere.' 20
With the possible exceptions, then, of Maryland and Connecti-
cut, it seems highly likely that the non-DOMA states would not find
the same-sex marriage to violate strong public policy. The non-DOMA
states would seem to have little interest in denying recognition of the
marriage, particularly in our scenario, when the parties made no at-
tempt to evade the forum's marital restriction. 121 Courts are much
more reluctant to invalidate migratory marriages than evasionary
11'
	 at 175.
" 5 Id. at 181.
116 1d. at 181-82.
117 Rosengarten, 802 A.2d at 181-82. If a court were to follow Rosengarten and to refuse
to recognize the marriage in Connecticut, that ruling would not necessarily preclude a
same-sex partner from seeking to obtain recognition of his or her parental rights by other
means. See infra notes 128-389 and accompanying text.
115
 Catalano, 170 A.2d at 728-29; Anderson v. Anderson, 238 A.2d 45,46 (Coma. Super.
Ct. 1967).
"5 Fensterwald v. Burk, 98 A. 358,360 (Md. 1916), writ of error dismissed 248 U.S. 592
(1918).
120 Delaney v. Delaney, 405 A.2d 91,93 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979); Jackson v. Jackson, 33
A. 317,319-20 (Md. 1895).
121 Although commentators have opined in the past that the existence of anti-sodomy
laws in a particular state might indicate that same-sex marriage was against public policy,
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas declared such statutes unconstitu-
tional. See generally 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Thus any statutes that remain on the books could
not be used to establish a policy against same-sex marriage recognition.
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marriages, although it has been done. 122 Indeed, section 283 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ("Second Restatement") provides
that "a marriage which satisfies the requirement of the state where the
marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless
it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of
the marriage." Comment k of section 283 of the Second Restatement
indicates that as of the drafting of the section, "a marriage had only
been invalidated when it violated a strong policy of a state where at
least one of the spouses was domiciled at the time of the marriage and
where both made their home immediately thereafter."'" This distinc-
tion between migratory and evasionary marriages held true, for the
most part, even in miscegenation cases where parties sought to have
an interracial marriage recognized in a jurisdiction which prohibited
such marriages to the point of criminalizing them. 125
 The need to
protect the parties' expectations and prevent one party from summa-
rily choosing to escape marital obligations by moving to another ju-
risdiction compels recognition of migratory marriages. 126 By contrast,
when both parties knowingly marry in a state in which they are not
domiciled, purposely to avoid restrictions in their home state, they are
arguably on notice of the vulnerability of the marriage and the poli-
cies for recognition are weaker. 127
Thus, in our hypothetical, Sarah has compelling arguments in fa-
vor of recognition of a marriage that neither offends public policy in
most of the non-DOMA states nor involves an attempt to evade the fo-
rum state's laws. Once the marriage is recognized, she would have all
122
 Sec Constitutional Constraints, supra note 18, at 2040, 2091-92; Mark Strasser, For
Whom Bell Tolls: On Subsequent Domiciles' Refusing to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, 66 U. CIN.
L. REV. 339, 340, 367-70 (1998). The problem of interstate recognition of evasionary same-
sex marriages contracted in Massachusetts may be moot. Governor Mitt Romney notified
the governors and attorneys general of the other forty-nine states that Massachusetts will
not issue licenses to same-sex couples from their states based on a 1913 law enacted when
Massachusetts recognized interracial marriages, but other states did not. Elizabeth Me-
!wen, Massachusetts Limits Gay Marriages, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2004, at All. Challenge to the
limitation as discriminatory seems highly likely.
1 " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971) (emphasis added).
124 Id. § 283(2) cmt. k.
146 See Koppel man, supra note 93, at 119-26 (discussing validity of non-evasive, interra-
cial marriages); P.H. Vartanian, Annotation, Recognition of Foreign Marriage as Affected by
Local Miscegenation Law, 3 A.L.R.2d 240, § 5 (1999).
126 Strasser, supra note 122, at 349.
1" It remains to be seen whether courts will limit application of the DOMAs to CVII-




Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 46:1
the legal rights outlined in Part I and would be able to pursue custody
and/or visitation with Madeleine. However a same-sex partner in
Sarah's position most likely will need to look to other bases for securing
her parental rights in the jurisdictions discussed in the next Section.
2. Recognition of Parental Rights in DOMA Jurisdictions
Although the ambiguous statutory language in Maryland and
Connecticut may give courts in those states grounds to deny recogni-
tion to a foreign same-sex marriage, the remaining eighty percent of
the states have clearly declared their unwillingness to validate an out-
of-state, same-sex marriage. Although the statutes vary, all expressly
state at a minimum that same-sex marriages either will not be recog-
nized or are against public policy. 128
 Thus Sarah would seem to be
foreclosed from arguing for validation of her marriage under choice
of law principles. 129
 However, the state DOMAs should not prevent
Sarah from gaining recognition of her parental rights. The key to ac-
complishing that goal will be to convince the court that it has jurisdic-
tion to hear the case, that the co-parent (spouse) has standing to
bring it, and that she has standing to bring it as a parent. For only as a
parent will she clearly and definitively be entitled to have the custody
question decided based on the best interests of the child.'"
a. Jurisdiction and Standing
Most custody and visitation disputes come to court in connection
with a divorce or a paternity action. In states with a DOMA, because
the court would not recognize the marriage, it may have no jurisdic-
tion to consider a divorce of the parties. Indeed, this type of jurisdic-
tional problem provided the basis for a Connecticut appellate court to
dismiss a petition for dissolution of a Vermont civil union brought in
128 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (summarizing statutory language).
129
 I am assuming for purposes of discussion that the DOMAs in each state would be
valid. 1 do not consider here arguments for invalidating those statutes. See Koppelman,
supra note 93, at 126-32 (arguing that the state DOMAs do not establish definitively blan-
ket non-recognition of mine-sex marriages, but leave room for recognition in some in-
stances); infra note 265 (discussing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-79; id. at 582-83 (O'Connor,
J., concurring); and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623, 634-35 (1996)). Sec generally Chris-
topher Rizzo, Banning State Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships: Constitutional Implications of
Nebraska's Initiative 916, 11 J.L. & Pcn: it 1 (2002) (analyzing a challenge to one state's par-
ticularly broad statute banning same-sex marriage).
130 For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in seeking visitation or custody as a non-
parent third party, see infra notes 453-467 and accompanying text.
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Connecticut. 13 ' In Rosengarten, a party to a Vermont civil union sought
to dissolve the union in Connecticut." 2 The trial court dismissed the
action on the grounds that it had no jurisdiction because the civil un-
ion was neither a marriage nor a "matter relating to family relations"
under the jurisdictional statutes.'" The appellate court affirmed.'"
Fortunately, however, courts typically have broad jurisdiction to
adjudicate disputes concerning children, including custody, visitation,
and child support, when the parents are not married.'" Even in Ro-
sengarten, the court indicated that the superior court would have had
jurisdiction under a "catchall" jurisdictional provision, if the civil un-
ion case had involved children.'"
Not all courts would necessarily agree. For example, in Curiale v.
Reagan, a California appellate court found it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to consider a visitation claim brought by a lesbian co-
parent."7 The court could only adjudicate a custody claim if it had a
proper proceeding before it, such as a dissolution, guardianship, or
dependency action.'" In the court's view, the petitioner lacked stand-
ing to initiate any of those proceedings." 9 However, in Nancy S. v.
151 Rosengarten, 802 A.2d at 184.
132
 Id. at 172.
133 Id.
124 Id. at 184.
135 See, e.g., ALA. Cont. § 12-17-24.2(a) (Supp. 2003); Amt. ConE ANN. § 9-I4-105(a)
(Michie 2002); DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 10, § 902 ((999); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.501—.542 (West
Supp. 2005); 750 hi.. Coma.. STAT. ANN. 5/601 (West Supp. 2004); Mn. CODE ANN., Floc
LAW § 1-201(a) (Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.5(c) (2003); R.I. GEN. LAws § 8-10-
3(a) (Supp. 2003); S.C. Cooi ANN. § 20-7-420(20) (Law. Co-op. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.12.190(I) (West 1997); In re Jones, No. 2000 CA 56, 2002 WL 940195, at *4-6
(Ohio Ct. App. May 10, 2002). Jurisdiction extends as well to custody and visitation dis-
putes between non-parents and parents. Sec, e.g., Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985, 988
(Alaska 1989) (commenting that the parental custody statute "does not imply that the
superior court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate custody disputes between a parent and a
non-parent. Such disputes are civil matters over which the superior court has undoubted
subject matter jurisdiction."); In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241, 248 (Ohio 2002) (stating that
jurisdiction of juvenile court "cannot be avoided merely because the petitioner is not a
'parent'" under the state's parentage act).
138 Rosengarten, 802 A.2d at 177 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-1 (17) (2001)). In addi-
tion, section 46b-1(8) of the General Statutes of Connecticut specifically provides jurisdic-
tion over "habeas corpus and other proceedings to determine the custody and visitation of
children." CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-1(8) (West 2004).
137
	 Cll. Rptr. 520, 522 (Ct. App. 1990); scc West v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d
160, 164 (Ct. App. 1997). In a 3-2 decision in 1997, the Vermont Supreme Court likewise
rejected a lesbian co-parent's claim to visitation based on lack of jurisdiction. Titchenal v.
Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 689-90 (Vt. 1997).
138
 Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
138 Id.
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Michele G., another California appellate court rejected this conclusion,
noting that "[a] court . . . lacks 'jurisdiction' only if it has no power to
render a decision over the dispute."'" Because the petitioner claimed
she was a parent, the court had jurisdiction to decide her status under
the UPA, though the court ultimately rejected her claim for lack of
standing."'
In the end, most courts would likely find jurisdiction to hear
Sarah's claim, but standing might prove the more formidable obstacle.
A same-sex parent in Sarah's position must have standing to petition
the court for custody or visitation. Although at common law, standing
can be established by showing that the petitioner "has some real inter-
est in the action," 142
 custody and related disputes are generally gov-
erned by statute. Such statutes typically provide that a child custody
proceeding can be initiated by a parent)" In some states, Sarah might
have to commence an additional legal proceeding to establish mater-
nity. For example, Arizona allows a parent to initiate a custody proceed-
ing by filing for dissolution of a marriage or legal separation or by filing
a proceeding to establish maternity)" However, Arizona also defines
"legal parent" as one who is related by blood or adoption)" Regardless
of the nature of the proceedings she must bring, Sarah will have to per-
suade the court that she is a parent under the relevant statute, even if
she is not biologically related to Madeleine. The crux of my argument
calls for recognition of parental status flowing from the marriage, even
if the DOMA declares the marriage void. The following Sections will
explore how a marriage declared invalid nonetheless can serve as the
basis for establishing standing as a parent.
140 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215 n.2 (Ct. App. 1991).
141 Id. at 215-19; see Thomas v. Thomas, 49 P.3d 306, 307-08 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002)
(finding that trial court had jurisdiction to hear partner's petition for custody when part-
ner had acted in loco parentis).
142
 Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APF01.137, 1997 WL 467327, at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 12,
1997) (Tyack, J., dissenting in part and concurring separately in part) (citing State ex rel.
Limier v. Lamier, 664 N.E.2d 1384, 1386 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)).
1 " See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060(a) (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-401
(West 2000); DEL, CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 721(a) (1999); 750 ILL. Come. STAT. ANN.
5/601(b) (1) (West Supp. 2004); lun. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-3 (Michie 2003); MoNT. Coin:
ANN. § 90-4-211(4)(a) (2003); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. 125.510 (Michie 2009); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-13.1 (2003); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5312 (West 2001); TENN. Coln: ANN.
§ 36-6-510 (2001).
144 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-401 (B) (1) (b), (B) (3) (West Supp. 2004).
145 Id. § 25-415(G) (2).
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b. Parental Rights Under the UPA
At least ten states with "category one" DOMAs have adopted the
UPA, including the provision that "[a] ny interested party may bring
an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and
child relationship."148 In these states, Sarah can argue that the mar-
riage, even if rendered invalid by the forum state's DOMA, establishes
her status as a mother under the UPA and qualifies her to seek cus-
tody as a parent. The language of this provision and the comparable
paternity provision suggest a broad scope that courts have been slow
to embrace, preferring to limit standing essentially to parents related
by biology, adoption, or, for men, marriage. 147 Indeed, a number of
judicial decisions have dismissed claims for custody or visitation by a
lesbian co-parent based on lack of standing, finding that the partner
did not meet the statutory definition of parent. 148 These cases are all
146 ALA. CODE § 26-17-18 (1992) (emphasis added); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650 (West
2004); Cot.o. REV. STAT. § 19-4-122 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 584-21 (Michie 1999);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/19 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1126 (2000); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 210.848 (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-121; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
126.231; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-21 (Michie 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.17-20 (2004);
see MINN. S'IAT. ANN. § 257.71 (West 2003) (including slightly different language); Onto
REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.17 (West 2000) (category two state); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15.8-26
(2003) (no DOMA).
147 ARIZ. REV. MAT. ANN. § 25-415(G) (2) (defining parent as biological or adoptive);
Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d at 246-47 (limiting "parent" to biological or adoptive under domestic
relations statute); Lynda A.H. v. Diane TO., 673 N.YS.2d 989, 991 (App. Div. 1998) (holding
that lesbian co-parent "who is neither the biological nor adoptive parent" lacked standing to
seek visitation); Liston, 1997 WL 467327, at *3 (defining parent under child support statute as
biological or adoptive); In re Parentage of L.B., 89 P.3d 271, 278-79 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004)
(finding that state's version of the Uniform Parentage Act (the "UPA") limits parentage to
marriage or biology, but that common law claims may be entertained), Proiew granted, 101
P.3d 107 (Wash. 2004); Ruthann Robson, Making Mothers: Lesbian Legal Theory and the Judicial
Construction of Lesbian Mothers, 22 Woso:N's Wis. L. REP. 15, 20 (2000) (observing that "[t] he
statutory schemes generally define 'parenthood' by a combination of biology and the legal
relationship between the putative parent and at least one biological parent"); see infra notes
150-152, 182-194 and accompanying text (discussing paternity presumptions). But see Liston,
1997 WL 467327, at *9-10 (Tyack, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (stating that
standing under child support statute not limited to 'biological or adoptive parents"); infra
note 149 (citing cases recognizing standing by lesbian co-parents).
148 E.g., K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 139 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding that lesbian co-
parent not a parent under the UPA), superseded by 97 P.3d 72 (Cal. 2004); In re Guardian-
ship of Z.C.W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 50 (Ct. App. 1999) (noting that courts of appeal have
determined a lesbian parent neither biologically nor adoptively related is not entitled to
custody); Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 219 (holding that lesbian partner not a parent under
the UPA); Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d at 246-47 (finding that same-sex partner not a "parent"
under the state's parentage act, but allowing partner and parent to enter into shared cus-
tody agreement); State ex rd. D.R.M., 34 P.3d 887, 891-92 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (finding
that lesbian co-parent not a parent under UPA); cf. McGuffin v. Overton, 542 N.W.2d 288,
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distinguishable from our hypothetical, though, because in none of
them had the partners legally married anywhere." 9
This distinction is significant because the UPA makes statutes re-
lated to establishing paternity applicable to establishing maternity,
insofar as practicable. 15° Indeed, the statutes addressing how a mother
can establish a parent-child relationship provide that the relationship
can be established by proof of the woman having given birth "or pur-
291-92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that partner not a parent and lacked standing un-
der child custody statute); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (finding
that partner not a parent and lacked standing under domestic relations law); Lynda A.H.,
673 N.Y.S.2d at 991 (finding that partner lacked standing to seek visitation); Parentage of
LB., 89 P.3d at 278-79, 285 (finding that lesbian co-parent did not meet the UPA
definition of parent, but could seek visitation as de facto parent).
149
 Moreover, as we shall see, courts are beginning to read the UPA more expansively
to recognize a co-parent's standing. See infra notes 217-237 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000)). Two Washington cases, in dicta,
suggested that the UPA might have provided an avenue for a lesbian co-parent to seek
visitation. Parentage of L.B., 89 P.3d at 278-79, 285; D.R114., 34 P.3d at 892. Parentage of L.B.
held, however, that a newer version of the UPA did not give a lesbian co-parent standing.
89 P.3d at 278-79, 285. Parentage of L.B. and other courts have recognized a partner's right
to pursue custody or visitation even in the absence of marriage on a variety of other theo-
ries though. E.g., In re Guardianship of Olivia J., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 368 (Ct. App. 2000)
(noting that a relative or any other person may file for guardianship, though such a non-
parent must show detriment to the child if he or she stays with the parent); In re Hirenia
C., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443, 448-50 (Ct. App. 1993) (allowing claims by de facto parents or
persons "with an interest" in the child); Laspina-Williams, 742 A.2d at 843 (noting that state
statute allows "any person" to seek visitation of a minor child); S.F. v. M.D., 751 A.2d 9, 15
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (allowing those deemed to be de facto parents to pursue visita-
tion); LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 160 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that "the
welfare of the child takes precedence" in determining custody); Russell v. Bridgens, 647
N.W.2d 56, 65 (Neb. 2002) (Gerrard, J„ concurring) (noting that the in loco parentis doc-
trine allows a co-parent or partner to pursue custody); VC., 748 A.2d at 550 (allowing
claims by those found to be psychological parents); A.G. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 664 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1992) (allowing such claims if in the best interests of the child); T.B. v. L.R.M.,
786 A.2d 913, 914 (Pa. 2001) (applying the doctrine of in loco parentis to grant standing for
custody or visitation); 89 P.3d at 285 (allowing common law claims of de facto or psycho-
logical parentage); H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d at 435 (allowing petitions for visitation when the
petitioner has a parent-like relationship with the child and a "significant triggering event"
justifies the state's involvement); cf. Chambers v. Chambers, No. CNO0-09493, 2002 WL
1940145, at *10 (Del. Fans. Ct. Feb. 5, 2002) (deeming lesbian co-parent a parent under
Delaware child support statute and finding that she was equitably estopped from denying
support obligation); Barnae, 943 P.2d at 1039-41 (suggesting that in analysis of interstate
jurisdictional dispute, co-parent would have standing in New Mexico to seek timesharing
and custody); Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780, 784 (Fam. Ct. 1985) (holding that
woman who posed as a man, married a woman, and consented to artificial insemination
was a parent responsible for child support for resulting children).
1 " See supra note 146.
20041	 Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Parents	 31
scant to the provisions of this chapter:151 The UPA provides that a
man is presumed to be the father if he and the child's mother "at-
tempted to marry each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent
compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared
invalid" and, if the marriage was declared invalid by a court, the child
was born within 300 days of that determination or, if the marriage is
invalid without a court order, the child was born within 300 days of
the termination of cohabitation.' 52 In our hypothetical, the parties did
attempt to marry, the marriage would be invalid in these DOMA ju-
risdictions, and the child was born within 300 days of the termination
of cohabitation. In essence, Sarah would, by "parity of reasoning," use
these provisions to establish herself as a presumed mother.'"
Courts already have relied on this type of analysis to establish pa-
rental rights for mothers who, are not biologically related to their
children. 154 The first case to do so was In re Marriage of Buzzanca. 155
Buzzanca involved claims surrounding a child who was born with the
assistance of reproductive technology. 156
 John and Luanne Buzzanca
arranged for a surrogate to carry to term a child conceived with do-
nor sperm and donor egg. 157 Shortly before the birth of the child, Jay-
cee, John and Luanne separated. 158 John subsequently refused to pay
child support on the ground that he was not Jaycee's father.'" The
trial court agreed, ruling that because neither he nor Luanne were
biologically related to Jaycee, neither was a legal parent.'w The Cah-
151 ALA. Cone § 26-17-4(1); accord 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/4(1) ("or under this
Act"); N.D. CENT. Cone § 1417-03(1).
152 ALA. Coot: § 26-17-5 (Supp. 2003) (emphasis added); CAL. Floc CODE § 7611 (West
2004); C01.0. Rev. STAT. § 19-4-105 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114 (2000); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 210.822 (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-04; accord MINN. SIM'. ANN. § 257.55
(West 2003) (limiting time to 280, rather than 300, days); Onto Rev. Coin ANN. § 3111.03
(West 2000); WAsn. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116 (West Supp. 2004); see also 750 COMP,
STAT. ANN. 45/5 (utilizing slightly different language and giving no time limit). The UPA
and these statutes provide another basis for presumed fatherhood—when a man receives the
child into his home and holds the child out as his own. The same-sex partner also would fall
into this category: indeed, so would many co-parenting same-sex couples who did not marry
or enter into a civil union or domestic partnership. But see KM., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 151-52
(rejecting claim by lesbian partner based on paternity presumption).
155
 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993); In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72
Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998).





152 Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282.
166 Id.
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fornia Court of Appeal reversed, rejecting a result that rendered the
child "a legal orphan." 161
 It held that John was the father based on an
analogy to the artificial insemination statute which declares that a
husband who consents to the insemination of his wife is the legal fa-
ther of the resulting child.' 62
 Like artificial insemination, the in vitro
fertilization which the Buzzancas planned for and initiated was a
medical procedure causing the procreation of a child and thus ren-
dering the Buzzancas the parents, regardless of their lack of biological
tie to jaycee. 163
 In Luanne's case, the court specifically relied on the
UPA provision allowing a mother-child relationship to be established
by proof of giving birth "or under this part.'" 4 In the court's view; this
provision allowed application of the UPA's artificial insemination pro-
vision to Luanne to establish maternity. 165
Subsequent cases support our argument even more directly. In In
re Karen C., the California Court of Appeal held that a woman who
had held a child out as her own was a presumed mother, and her
child, Karen, the subject of a dependency proceeding, had standing
to bring an action to establish a mother-child relationship under Cali-
fornia's UPA. 166
 Karen's biological parents had given her to Leticia,
the presumed mother, shortly after Karen's birth. 167 At the hospital,
the birth mother had identified herself as Leticia, so that Leticia's
name would be on the birth certificate. 168 Leticia thereafter raised
Karen as her own, allowing Karen to believe she had been adopted.' 69
161 Id. at 284,293-94.
166
 Id. at 284-88.
10 Id. at 282. Although not decided under the UPA, Karin T v. Michael T used similar
reasoning to hold a woman responsible for child support. 484 NXS.2d at 784. The woman,
Marlene, had posed as a man, Michael, and married Karin. Id. at 781. Michael subse-
quently signed a consent to the artificial insemination of Karin. Id. at 782. Two children
were born to the couple by this method. Id. at 781-82. Upon separation, Karin sought
child support, Id. at 781. The court granted the petition, even though a proceeding to void
the marriage was pending, on the grounds that Michael's signing of the consent brought
the children into the world as if done biologically." Id. at 784; accord Chambers, 2002 WL
1990145, at *10 (lesbian co-parent's involvement in artificial insemination of partner
"while biologically not providing the genetic material necessary to conceive this child,
constituted a symbolic act of procreation").
164 Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284.
166 Id. at 288. Building on Buzzanca, lesbian co-parents in California have sought and
obtained declarations of parentage under the UPA when one partner has consented to the
artificial insemination of the other and both intend to raise the child together. NATI ent.
FOR LESBIAN RIGIEIS, supra note 69, at 5-6.
166 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677,679,681 (Ct. App. 2002).
167 Id. at 678.
UM Id.
166 Id.
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These facts came to light when Karen was ten and became a depend-
ent of the court due to Leticia's abuse and neglect.'" Karen peti-
tioned the court to determine that a mother-child relationship existed
with Leticia)" The juvenile court denied the request on the grounds
that Leticia was neither a birth nor genetic mother. 172
On appeal, the court declared Leticia a presumed mother)" The
court reached this conclusion by applying the presumptions contained
in section 7611 of the California Family Code, which deal with pater-
nity.'" The court recognized that a paternity judgment represents not
solely a reflection of genetics, but rather "a mixture of a search for ge-
netic truth and the implementation of the strong public policies favor-
ing marriage and family stability, and disfavoring labels of illegiti-
macy: 175 Thus, a judgment of paternity could be, in the court's words,
"a decretal fiction"—a fiction created by decree.'" The court went on
to conclude that these principles "should apply equally to women." 177
The analysis did not end there, however, because section 7612(a)
of the California Family Code allows these parentage presumptions to
be rebutted "in an appropriate action by clear and convincing evi-
dence: 178 The question remained in Karen C. whether this was an ap-
propriate action for rebutting the presumption.'" The court re-
manded the case to the juvenile court for a determination on that
issue. 180 The analysis of that question would include public policy con-
siderations, such as whether the courts should allow a form of de facto
adoption that bypassed all legal formalities. 181
The question for us, then, is whether our hypothetical case pres-
ents "an appropriate action" for rebuttal of the presumption of moth-
erhood created by the invalid same-sex marriage. Other cases can
help to guide us in this analysis. •
In In re Nicholas H., the California Supreme Court held that a man
who was not biologically related to the child he helped to raise none-
170 Id.
17 ' Karen C., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 678.
172 Id.
175 Id. at 679.
174 Id. at 679-81.
175 Id. at 680.
176 Karen C., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 680.
' 77 Id. at 681.
178 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(a) (West 2004); Karen C., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 680.
175 Karen C., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 681.
185 Id.
181 Id. at 683.
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theless would be considered a "presumed father" entitled to custody.' 82
The presumed father, Thomas, had lived with the boy, Nicholas, and his
mother, Kimberly, on and off over a period of several years, beginning
while Kimberly was pregnant with Nicholas. 183 Nicholas's birth
certificate identified Thomas as the father) 84 Thomas provided
financial support for Nicholas and throughout the years acted as his
father.'8 Kimberly had a history of drug use and violence, including an
arrest and jail time for felony assault) 86 Shortly after her release, the
police placed Nicholas in the custody of the Alameda County Social
Services Agency) 87 In a dependency proceeding, the juvenile court
placed Nicholas with Thomas and ordered family reunification services
for Kimberly) 88 On appeal, the court of appeals held that the presump-
tion of paternity supporting placement with Thomas was rebutted by
Thomas's admission that he was not Nicholas's biological father) 89 The
California Supreme Court reversed, holding that this was not an "ap-
propriate action" to rebut the presumption of parentage provided by
the statute)" In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on previous
cases which had held that "the extant father-child relationship is to be
preserved at the cost of biological ties." 191 The court emphasized that
the social relationship between the father and child was "much more
important" to the child than biological paternity) 92 However the court
also distinguished cases involving competing claims by candidates vying
for parental rights)93 In Nicholas H., if the court had allowed rebuttal of
Thomas's presumed father status, Nicholas would have been left with
no father and a troubled mother) 94
182 46 P.3d 932, 941 (Cal. 2002).
' 83 Id. at 934-35.
184 Id. at 935.
"6 Id.
188 Id. at 934-35.
157 Nicolas H., 46 P.3d at 934-35.
laa Id. at 936.
1e® Id.
19° Id. at 941.
191 Id. at 938 (citing Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 703 P.2d 88, 93 (Cal. 1985); Comino v.
Kelley, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728, 731 (Ct. App. 1994)).
162
 Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 938 (quoting Susan H. v. Jack S., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 124
(Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Estate of Cornelious, 674 P.2d 245, 248 (Cal. 1984)) (internal
quotations omitted).
183
 Id. at 936.
164 M Nicholas's purported biological father, a man named Jason, had never come
forward and the Alameda County Social Services Agency was unable to locate him or es-
tablish his paternity. Id. at 933, 935.
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In In. re Salvador M., a California appellate court applied the
Nicholas H. analysis to a presumed mother case. 195 There, the court
declared a woman to be a presumed mother of a child she was raising
even though the two were not biologically related. 19G Once again, the
issue arose in a dependency case. 197 The petitioner, Monica, was the
half-sister of Salvador, the subject of the dependency proceeding. 198
Monica was eighteen when Salvador was born and already had a child
of her own. 199 She and their mother, Rosa, cared for both children,
and Monica continued to care for Salvador after Rosa was killed when
Salvador was three."° Five years later, Monica was arrested on drug
charges, and social services took Salvador into protective custody.201
Monica admitted to the social worker that she was Salvador's sister,
although Salvador believed she was his mother. 262
 Monica filed a mo-
tion for de facto parent status and to establish maternity.205 The appel-
late court found that, although Monica had confided to school
officials that she was Salvador's sister, she otherwise had held him out
to the world as her son, qualifying her for presumed mother status
under section 7611 of the California Family Code. 2" Unlike in Karen
C., the court did not require a remand on the rebuttal question; it
ruled that this was not an appropriate action to rebut the presump-
tion.245 The court observed that It] he paternity presumptions are
driven, not by biological paternity, but by the state's interest in the
welfare of the child and the integrity of the family." 20° An existing par-
ent-child relationship "is 'considerably more palpable than the bio-
logical relationship of actual paternity' and 'should not be lightly dis-
solved.'"20 The court found no justification for severing the "deeply-
rooted mother/child bond" in contravention of the state's interest in
preserving the family relationship. 208
195 In re Salvador M., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705,708-09 ( Ct. App. 2003).
198 Id. at 709.
197 Id. at 707.
198 Id. at 706.
too Id.
206 Salvador M., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 706.
281 Id. at 706-07.
262 Id. at 707.
298 Id.
2" Id. at 708-09.
"5 Salvador M., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 709; Karen C., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 681.
988 Salvador M., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 708.
"7 Id. (quoting Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 938).
208 Id. at 709.
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The policies supporting findings of presumed parenthood in
Nicholas H. and Salvador M, as well as Buzzanca, apply with equal or
greater force in the case of a same-sex partner seeking to maintain the
parental status acquired by virtue of the same-sex marriage. In our
hypothetical case, Sarah has an existing parent-child relationship with
Madeleine; indeed, she has acted as Madeleine's primary caretaker
since infancy. Their "deeply-rooted" attachment deserves protection
and is essential to Madeleine's well-being. 209 To allow the denial of
Sarah's parental status would deprive Madeleine of her second parent
with no alternative candidate available to fill that role.
Some might argue, however, that these precedents are distin-
guishable. After all, Nicholas H. and Salvador M. involved dependency
proceedings, not custody cases between two fit parents, and the Nicho-
las H. court explicitly differentiated cases in which "another candidate
is vying for parental rights and seeks to rebut a § 7611(d) presump-
tion in order to perfect his claim."219
 Andrea undoubtedly would
claim to be such a candidate.
However, the existence of another fit parent does not lessen the
devastating impact on Madeleine of destroying Sarah's parental
rights. Courts have noted the tremendous harm that can occur to the
child when one parent has the power to summarily sever the child's
relationship with the other, non-biological, parent. A Pennsylvania
court made the following observation:
In this era of artificial insemination, surrogate parenting and
in-vitro fertilization, legal rights of a non-biological parent
may become fixed by virtue of the parties' actions and the de-
velopmental relationship of the child with the parent. To
permit one parent to revoke the parentage of the other par-
ent, once these rights have been legally determined ... invites
chaos to the child's emotional well-being and legal status. 213
20" See Rubano, 759 A.2d at 975 (stating that "'children have a strong interest in main-
taining the ties that connect them to adults who love and provide for them*" (quoting VC.,
748 A.2d at 550)).
21° Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 941.
211
 Coburn v, Coburn, 558 A.2d 548, 552-53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); accord Sider v. Sider,
639 A.2d 1076, 1086 (Md. 1994). The Sidercourt stated the following:
"A relationship resulting in bonding and psychological dependence upon a
person without biological connection can develop during an ongoing bio-
logical parent/child relationship. Particularly is this true when the relation-
ship is developed in the context of a family unit and is fostered, facilitated
and, for most of the child's life, encouraged by the biological parent. That
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Moreover, cases outside the dependency context likewise have ac-
knowledged the importance, indeed the primacy, of the social rela-
tionship and the parent-child bond, even at the expense of biological
ties. In numerous cases pitting biological fathers against non-
biological fathers who were married to or cohabiting with the mother
at the time of conception or birth of the child, the courts have de-
clared that a presumption of parenthood based on biology does not
necessarily trump presumed parenthood based on other circum-
stances.'" In several cases, the court ultimately sided with the non-
biological fathers. 2u Likewise, courts have refused to let biology con-
trol in cases even closer to our hypothetical, in which a wife tried to
disestablish the paternity of her husband during a divorce.2 u Buz-
zanca, of course, extended this notion even further. There, the court
recognized parental status created by initiating the in vitro fertiliza-
tion and surrogacy arrangement, even in the absence of an existing
the relationships, one with a known biological parent and the other with an
acknowledged, though, in fact, non-biological, parent, progress at the same
time, does not render either less viable."
639 A.2d at 1086 (quoting Monroe v. Monroe, 621 A.2d 898, 906 (Md. 1993)).
212 E.g., Steven W. v. Matthew S., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535, 538-39 (Ct. App. 1995); N.A.l1. v.
S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 363-64 (Colo. 2000); Doe v. Doe, 52 P.3d 255, 262 (Haw. 2002); Witso v.
Overby, 627 N.W.2d 63, 69 (Minn. 2001); In re Welfare of C.M.G., 516 N.W.2d 555, 560
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994); cf. Monroe, 621 A.2d at 904-05 (holding that court must consider
variety of factors, including best interests of the child, before ordering blood tests re-
quested by mother to disestablish paternity of husband).
213 E.g., Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 703 P.2d 88, 95 (Cal. 1985); C.M.G., 516 N.W.2d at
561. The California Supreme Court also sided with the non-biological father in the appeal
of a dependency petition presenting conflicting presumptions of paternity. In re jesusa V.,
85 P.3d 2, 6 (Cal. 2004).
214 E.g., State v. P., 457 N.Y.S.2d 488, 493 (App. Div. 1982) (commenting that "ftlo
countenance the wife's attempt to deny the husband's paternity after she allowed the hus-
band and [daughter] to develop a father-daughter relationship, would be a cruel and un-
seemly affront to decency and morality to which the law should not give its imprimatur"
and citing cases that refuse to allow biology to control when wife tried to disestablish pa-
ternity of husband). Courts in these cases rely on a variety of theories, including the "equi-
table parent doctrine" and equitable estoppel. E.g., Titus v. Rayne, No. CN91-6133, 1992
WL 437586, at *13-14 (Del. Pam. Ct. Nov. 19, 1992) (relying on equitable estoppel the-
ory); Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Iowa 1995) (citing cases relying on
equitable estoppel to prevent disestablishment of paternity for biological reasons); Atkin-
son v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (relying on equitable parent
doctrine); Commonwealth ex rel. Coburn, 558 A.2d 548, 551-52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (rely-
ing on equitable estoppel theory). Not all courts have adopted these theories. E.g., D.G. v.
D.M.K., 557 N.W.2d 235, 243 (S.D. 1996) (rejecting equitable parent theory); T.W.E. v.
K.M.E., 828 S.1A7.2d 806, 809 (Tex. App. 1992) (rejecting equitable estoppel theory).
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parent-child relationship. 215
 Parental status could be created without
genetic tie, merely by intending to become a parent. 216
The idea of using paternity provisions to establish legal mother-
hood arose in a context closest to our hypothetical in Rubano v. Di-
Cenzo.217 In Rubano, a lesbian co-parent sought visitation with her for-
mer partner's biological child, conceived by artificial insemination
during the relationship.218
 After the couple separated, Maureen
Rubano filed a petition to establish her de facto parent status and to ob-
tain visitation. 219 She and DiCenzo subsequently agreed to permanent
visitation, and the family court entered an order to that effect. 2" Di-
Cenzo reneged on the agreement; Rubano sought to enforce it. 221
 The
family court sought guidance from the Rhode Island Supreme Court as
to whether it had jurisdiction to enter the visitation order and whether
the non-biological partner had standing to petition for visitation. 222 The
court answered both questions in the affirmative. 2"
Initially, the court rejected Rubano's claim for jurisdiction based
on "equitable matters arising out of the family relationship" because
the family court jurisdiction statute applied only to petitions for di-
vorce or separate maintenance. 224 However, the court found two other
independent bases supporting jurisdiction in the family court. 225 It
began by evaluating the family court's jurisdiction under Rhode Is-
land's Uniform Law on Paternity ("ULP").226 The ULP tracks the UPA
language discussed earlier, allowing "any interested party" to petition
to establish a mother-child relationship and making applicable the
213 Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293-94.
216 Id. at 282; see Thomas, 49 P.3d at 307-09 (holding that mother's former domestic
partner who acted in loco parentis could seek custody of child); In re ferry P.. 116 Cal. Rptr.
2d 123,125 (Ct. App.) (holding that man never married to mother nor genetically related
to child has constitutional right to establish presumed father status when mother or third
parties blocked ability to receive child into his home, if he makes substantial efforts to
assume parental responsibilities), superseded by 46 P.3d 331 (Cll.), review dismissed and cause
remanded 1153 P.3d 133 (Cal. 2002).
217 S6E759 A.2d at 970.
216 Id. at 961.
216
 Id. at 962.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 962-63.
222 Rubano, 759 A.2d at 963.
223 Id. at 965,967.
224
 Id. at 965.
223 Id. at 965-72.
226 Id. at 966.
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paternity statutes "insofar as practicable." 2" An earlier Rhode Island
case, Pettinato v. Pettinato, had affirmed an award of custody to a non-
biological father, deemed a de facto father by the court, over the
mother's objections, finding that the mother was estopped from chal-
lenging the parental relationship. 228 The court applied the same rea-
soning to Rubano's claim, declaring her an "interested party" under
the ULP, because she had functioned as a parent, even though she
was not biologically related to the child. 229 The court next found a
separate and additional ground for family court jurisdiction. 23°
Rubano's claim for visitation fell within "matters relating to adults
who shall be involved with paternity of children born out of wed-
lock."23 i In a footnote, the court noted the obvious—that the word
"paternity" typically denoted fatherhood, but also that the legislature
had instructed that statutes be construed in a gender-neutral man-
ner.232 Rubano was "involved with" the child's paternity because she
and DiCenzo jointly planned to bear and to raise the child, because
she helped to arrange the insemination procedure and paid for it,
because the child's last name was a hyphenated version of both their
surnames, and because Rubano helped raise the child for four
years. 233 Thus, the court found two bases for jurisdiction sufficient to
grant her standing to seek adjudication of her parental claims.234
Clearly, the Rubano decision strongly bolsters Sarah's claim in our
hypothetical. She, like Rubano, participated in the planning of the
insemination and acted as a parent—indeed, she was the primary
caretaker for Madeleine. Of course, Rubano would grant Sarah stand-
ing to pursue visitation regardless of whether she had ever married
Andrea. The marriage, even if deemed invalid because of a DOMA,
227 Rubano, 759 A.2d at 966. This language is identical to California's. Id. at 982 (Bour-
crier, J., concurring and dissenting).
228 Id. at 967-68 (citing Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909 (R.I. 1990)).
229 Id. at 969.
230 Id. at 970. The court found a basis for superior court jurisdiction as well. Id. at 972.
231 Id. at 970.
232 Rubano, 759 A.2d at 970. The court noted that it was
mindful of the Legislature's instruction that when statutes are construed
"[e]very word importing the masculine gender only, may be construed to ex-
tend to and to include females as well as males." Thus, two women may cer-
tainly be "adults who shall he involved with paternity" of a child for purposes
of this statute.
Id. at 97011.13 (citations omitted) (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 4-3-3,8-10-3(a) (1956)).
233 Id. at 971.
234
 Id. at 977.
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nonetheless further buttresses Sarah's claim for de facto parent status
by giving her a clearly defined alternative basis for standing. 235
 The
California presumed mother cases and the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's willingness to apply the paternity statutes to a same-sex
mother's claim provide an avenue for other UPA states to recognize
the rights of a same-sex spouse, even if their DOMAs prohibit recogni-
tion of the marriage.
Some may claim that these cases stretch the application of the
UPA too far.256
 However, they are consistent with the UPA's purpose:
the UPA seeks to eliminate discrimination against illegitimate chil-
dren.237 As the Hawaii Supreme Court observed, "The fundamental
purposes of [the UPA] are 'to provide substantive legal equality for all
children regardless of the marital status of their parents' and to pro-
tect the rights and ensure the obligations of parents of children born
out of wedlock."2" Children being raised by same-sex couples are to a
large degree a new breed of illegitimates, suffering a fate similar to
their predecessors born to unwed mothers in prior generations. Both
groups have been deprived of a host of rights, benefits, and protec-
tions, not the least of which is a continuing relationship with both
parents, based solely on their parents' marital status or lack thereof. 239
The UPA offers one way to ameliorate the children's position
without running afoul of a DOMA. But a court in a UPA state reluc-
tant to tread this path, as well as courts in non-UPA states, can still
recognize the parental rights bestowed on the co-parent by the mar-
riage on a variety of other theories, as the next Section details.
235 Unlike Rubano, Sarah cannot rely on a written agreement entered into after the re-
lationship dissolved, as Rubano did in seeking to assert her visitation rights. Id. at 961-63.
Moreover, Rubano only considered a claim for visitation, though its reasoning would seem
to allow a suit for custody as well. See id. at 965-77.
236 See id. at 981-82 (Bourcier, J., concurring and dissenting).
237 KM., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 141; Dunkin v. Boskey, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 49, 55 (Ct. App.
2000); Doe, 52 P.3d at 261-62.
238 Doe, 52 P.3d at 261 (quoting H.R. 8-190, Reg. Sess., at 1019 (Haw. 1975)).
239
 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 956-57, 964 (Mass. 2003); De-
bra Carrasquillo Hedges, Note, The Forgotten Children: Same-Sex Partners, Their Children and
Unequal Treatment, 41 B.C. L. REV. 883, 903 (2000); see Lewis A. Silverman, Suffer the Little
Children: fustifiing Same-Sex Marriage from the Perspective of a Child of the Union, 102 W. VA. L.
REV. 411, 436-49 (1999) (discussing benefits enjoyed by children of married parents, de-
nied to children of same-sex couples).
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c. Parental Rights as an Incident of the Marriage
Sarah can argue first that her claim does not require recognition
of the marriage per se. Rather, a court could, and should, recognize
one particular incident of the marriage—her status as Madeleine's
parent. A number of scholars suggest. that courts have the power to
distinguish treatment of the marriage from treatment of the incidents
of the marriage.24° Case law also supports this approach. For example,
in in. re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, a California appellate court allowed
multiple wives to a polygamous marriage, contracted in India, to in-
herit from their husband, the decedent, who was domiciled in Cali-
fornia for some years leading up to and at the time of his cleath. 241
The trial court ruled that under the laws and public policy of Califor-
nia, only the first wife of the decedent would be recognized. 242 The
appellate court reversed, holding that the public policy which trou-
bled the trial court would be relevant only if the wives had attempted
to cohabitate with their husband in California. 245
 By contrast, "where
only the question of descent of property is involved, public policy is
not affected. "244
Miller v. Lucks took a similar approach in a miscegenation case. 245
There, the decedent, a black woman, had married a white man in Mis-
sissippi. 246 To avoid prosecution under Mississippi's anti-miscegenation
law, the couple fled to Illinois, where they married again, legally. 247 The
husband later claimed to be his wife's sole heir in a probate proceeding
240 Cox, supra note 18, at 1062 n.168 (recognizing the power of the courts to distin-
guish treatment of the marriage from treatment of the incidents of marriage, but arguing
against application of the doctrine in same-sex marriage cases); J. David Fine, The Applica-
tion of Issue-Analysis to Choice of Law Involving Family Law Matters in the United Slates, 26 Loy.
L. Rev. 31, 33-34 (1980); Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 51 FLA. L.
REv. 799, 841-42 (1999); Mark Strasser, Judicial Good Faith and the Baehr Essentials: On Giv-
ing Credit Where It's Due, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 313, 363-64 (1997). The first Restatement of Conflict
of Laws provision addressing choice of law in questions of marriage validity leaves room for
a state to refuse to recognize a marriage which "offends a community's moral sense," but it
also recognizes the harshness of denying an incident of marriage to a legally married cou-
ple and urges recognition "unless enjoyment of that incident 'violently offends the moral
sense of the community.'" Cox, supra note 18, at 1085 (quoting Charles W. Tain tor, II, Mar
riagr in the Conflict of Laws, 9 VAN!). L. REV. 607, 615 (1956)) (emphasis added).
241 188 13.2d 499, 502 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
242
 Id. at 499.
243 Id. at 502.
244 Id.
245 36 So. 2d 140, 142 (Miss. 1948).
248 Id. at 141.
247 Id.
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brought in Mississippi. 248
 The court agreed to recognize the marriage
only for purposes of inheritance. 249
 Even though interracial marriage
was a criminal offense and prohibited by the state constitution at the
time, the court found that the purpose of the statute was to prevent an
interracial couple from living together. 250
 Allowing the husband to in-
herit would not violate this policy. 251
These precedents carry particular weight because they involved
forms of marriage—polygamous and interracial—that were prohib-
ited widely, in the case of die former, and very strongly opposed, in
the case of the latter. Indeed, in his research on the miscegenation
precedents, Andrew Koppelman describes the public policy against
miscegenation as "exceedingly strong."252 In State v. Ross, the North
Carolina Supreme Court described an interracial marriage as "revolt-
ing," yet nonetheless recognized the marriage of the parties, legally
contracted in South Carolina. 253
Two questions arise, then: what is the purpose behind the statutes
refusing to recognize same-sex marriages and would recognition of
Sarah's parental status violate this policy? Were we actually litigating
this case in a particular jurisdiction, we undoubtedly would delve into
other sources, including legislative history, to ascertain the policy be-
hind that state's DOMA. It is enough for our purposes here to canvas
the possible justifications for the statutes. Some state DOMAs have
codified a statement of purpose. 254
 For example, Alabama's Marriage
Protection Act states the following:
Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a
man and a woman. As a matter of public policy, this state has
a special interest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting
the unique relationship in order to promote, among other
goals, the stability and welfare of society and its children.
248 Id.
249
 Id. at 142.
233
 Miller, 36 So. 2d at 142.
251 Id.
252 Koppelman, supra note 93, at 109.
233
 76 N.C. 242, 246-47 (1877). Indeed, in language that echoes the arguments against
same-sex marriage, the Virginia courts declared that interracial marriage simply could
not exist because the Deity had deemed such a union intrinsically unnatural.* Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw.) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967)), reconsidera-
tion granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993).
254 ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(b), (c) (1998); Mimi. COMP. LAws § 551.1 (Stipp. 2004)
STAT. ANN. § 25.1 (Michie Stipp. 2000)); ThNN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113(a) (2001).
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Marriage is a sacred covenant, solemnized between a man
and a woman. 255
Tennessee states it somewhat differently:
Tennessee's marriage licensing laws reinforce, carry for-
ward, and make explicit the long-standing public policy of
this state to recognize the family as essential to social and
economic order and the common good and as the funda-
mental building block of our society. To that end, it is fur-
ther the public policy of this state that the historical institu-
tion and legal contract solemnizing the relationship of one
(1) man and one (1) woman shall be the only legally recog-
nized marital contract in this state in order to provide the
unique and exclusive rights and privileges to marriage. 256
Washington's statute defining marriage as "a civil contract between a
male and a female" contains findings affirming a Washington appel-
late court decision that. denied persons of the same sex the right to
marry. 257 The findings state that lilt is a compelling interest of the
state of Washington to reaffirm its historical commitment to the insti-
tution of marriage as a union between a man and a woman as hus-
band and wife and to protect that institution." 258 Other mini-DOMAs
contain similar explanations. 259
These statements indicate that the DOMAs' chief purpose is to
protect and to preserve the separate and exalted status of "marriage"
as an institution historically comprised of a man and a woman. The
DOMAs do not necessarily manifest. a desire to prohibit. same-sex
partners front obtaining some of the benefits of marriage through
other means. The example of California is instructive. In 2000, Cali-
fornians overwhelmingly voted to approve Proposition 22, declaring
that only marriage between a man and a woman would be valid in the
state. 260 Yet three years later, the legislature enacted A.B. 205, a corn-
255 ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(h), (c) (internal numbering omitted).
256 TENN, CODE ANN. § 36-3.113(a).
257 WAsic. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010 (West Supp. 2004) (Historical and Statutory
Notes: Intent (citing Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) ) ).
258 Id. (Historical and Statutory Notes: Intent (quoting S.H.B. 1130, ch. 1, § 2, 55th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1998) (enacted to amend §§ 26.04.010—.020)).
259 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 86 {West 1999) (Legislative Intent: Traditional Marriage
(quoting H.R. 30-124, Reg. Sess. (La. 1996))); Mtcrt. Contr. LAws § 551.1 (Mtut. STAT.
ANN. § 25.1); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2001).
26° Marriage Watch.org , Marriage Law Project, California Proposition 22, at httpl/mar
riagelaw.ctia.edu/media/prop22.chn (last updated Apr. 14, 2009) (stating that 9,618,673
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prehensive domestic partnership statute providing virtually all the
rights, benefits, and responsibilities of marriage to same-sex part-
ners."' Hawaii's statutes reveal a similar, though less pronounced, di-
chotomy.262
 This inconsistency suggests that the state DOMA's pur-
pose, at least in "category one," tnay be largely symbolic. 263
 Even the
(61.4%) voted in favor, and 2,909,370 (38.6%) against Proposition 22—a twenty-three-
point margin).
261 See supra note 17. A lawsuit challenging A.13. 205 on the grounds that it violates
Proposition 22 is pending. Suit Filed Against Gay Rights Law, SAN DIEGO UNION-MIR., Sept.
23, 2003, at A5, 2003 WLNR 13428737. The author of Proposition 22, Pete Knight, also has
spearheaded a campaign to repeal A.B. 205 by initiative, an effort unsuccessful so far. Do-
mestic-Partner Bill May Face Referendum, SAN DIEGO UNION-MIR., Oct. 4, 2003, at A6, 2003
WLNR 13439763; Ann Perry, State Has OK'd Some Rights for Gay Couples, SAN DIEGO UNION-
MIR., Mar. 7, 2004, at H1, 2004 WLNR 16993121.
262 See HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572-1, -3 (Michie 1999). Section 572C-2 of the Hawaii
Revised Statutes states the following:
The legislature finds that the people of Hawaii choose to preserve the tra-
dition of marriage as a unique social institution based upon the committed
union of one man and one woman. The legislature further finds that because
of its unique status, marriage provides access to a multiplicity of rights and
benefits ... that are contingent upon that status....
However, the legislature concurrently acknowledges that there are many
individuals who have significant personal, emotional, and economic relation-
ships with another individual yet are prohibited ... from marrying. For ex-
ample two individuals who are of the same gender. Therefore, the legisla-
ture believes that certain rights and benefits presently available only to
married couples should be made available to couples comprised of two indi-
viduals who are legally prohibited from marrying one another.
Id. § 572C-2. Pennsylvania evidences a similar perspective through court decisions. Its do-
mestic relations statute stated that it is "the strong and longstanding public policy of this
Commonwealth that marriage shall be between one man and one woman" and goes on to
deny recognition to same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1704. Concurrently, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized a lesbian
partner's right to seek visitation with the biological child of her partner. See TB., 786 A.2d
at 914. It has also allowed for the possibility of second parent adoptions by same-sex part-
ners. See In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1201-02 (Pa. 2002).
263 Koppelman, supra note 93, at 126-32; sec Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802
N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004) (Sosmand., dissenting) (describing battle over whether civil
union would satisfy equal protection under Massachusetts Constitution as "a squabble over
the name to be used" and stating that we have a pitched battle over who gets to use the
'm' word"); cf. Maggie Gallagher, Massachusetts v. Marriage, WKI.Y. STANDARD, Dec. 1, 2003,
at 21, 25. Maggie Gallagher noted the following:
What some dismiss as protecting '`merely" the word marriage is actually 90
percent of the loaf. If a married couple no longer consists of a husband and
wife, we lose the shared meaning of the word; we lose the ability to speak the
idea in public and be understood. Such ideas are what culture is made of....
The opponents of marriage understand what many of its friends do not: Cap-
turing the word is the key to deconstructing the institution.
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last line of the Tennessee statement, referencing the rights and privi-
leges of marriage, would not bar Sarah inexorably from pursuing rec-
ognition of the marriage as a basis for parental rights, because paren-
tal rights apply to unmarried is well as married persons. 264 They are
not "unique and exclusive" to marriage.
Other reasons for prohibiting recognition of same-sex marriage
might include expressing moral disapproval of those relationships or
animus toward gays and lesbians. Of course, statutes enacted for these
purposes may well prove unconstitutional under Lawrence v. Texas and
Romer v. Evans.265 Putting aside this constitutional challenge, Sarah
could argue, even here, that recognizing her parental rights after the
relationship has ended does not express approval of the relationship,
because it does not encourage the parties to remain together. Nor
does it confer on the parties uniquely spousal benefits. It merely pro-
tects the parent-child relationship that has formed, which is consistent
with the policy in virtually every state of promoting the best interests
of the child. 266 Likewise, although these statutes may express preju-
dice toward gays and lesbians, the overwhelming majority of states
today recognize that gays and lesbians can be good parents and will
not deprive a gay or lesbian parent of custody or visitation solely based
on their sexual orientation. 267 '
Id.
264 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113(a) (2001).
265 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-79; Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. In Lawrence, the U.S. Su-
preme Court struck down Texas's anti-sodomy statute, finding that it violated the Due Proc-
ess Clause because it furthered "no legitimate state interest" which could "justify its intru-
sion into the personal and private life of the individual." 539 U.S. at 578. Moral objections
to homosexual sodomy would not suffice. Id. at 582-83 (O'Connor; J., concurring). Fur-
thermore, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, concurring, observed that "we have never held
that moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale
under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of per-
sons." Id. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Romer, the Court struck down an amend-
ment to Colorado's constitution which deprived gays and lesbians of protection under state
anti-discrimination laws as a violation of equal protection. 517 U.S. at 623. The provision,
"born of animosity toward the class of persons affected," bore no rational relation to a le-
gitimate state interest. Id. at 634-35. See generally Barbara A. Robb, Note, The constitutionality
of the Defense of Marriage Act in the Waite of Romer v Evans, 32 NEw ENG. L. REV. 263 (1997)
(arguing that the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, in light of the Romerdecision, renders the federal DOMA unconstitutional).
266 See infra note 335 and accompanying text (citing and discussing statutory authority
concerning the hest interest of the child standard and the familial relationship).
267
 Sec infra notes 341-343 and accompanying text (discussing state approaches to cus-
tody determinations, including the nexus test).
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d. Parental Rights Based on Legitimation
Alternatively, a same-sex partner could eschew asking the court to
grant her parental status as an incident to the marriage. Rather, she
would argue that the marriage, whether void in the forum jurisdiction
or not, served to legitimate the child born into the relationship and
thereby created a legal parent-child relationship. Under this approach,
Sarah would argue that the choice of law rules governing parent-child
relationships, and legitimacy in particular, should govern the question
of her right to seek custody of and visitation with Madeleine.
It has been the case since at least the Roman civil law that mar-
riage conferred legitimacy on children born while the mother was
married. 268
 Indeed, this rule generally was interpreted to establish a
conclusive presumption of paternity in the husband of the mother;
until fairly recent times, only proof of impotence or non-access could
rebut the presumption.269
 Therefore, husbands who were not in fact
the biological fathers of their children nonetheless were considered
to be the legal fathers of those children for all purposes. Even in
modern times, this presumption persists and has withstood constitu-
tional challenge. 2 70 Children born out-of-wedlock may be considered
illegitimate and have no legal relationship with their father. 271 Their
status can change, however, under certain circumstances. Typically, a
father can legitimate his children by later marrying the mother or by
certain other legitimating acts, such as acknowledging the child in
writing.272
 These methods of legitimation vary from state to state. Re-
gardless of the method, legitimation creates a parent-child relation-
ship in the eyes of the law which did not exist previously. 273 Once cre-
ated, that relationship carries with it all the rights, privileges, and
268 Donald C. Huhin, Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling the Puzzles of Paternity, 13 CORNELL
J.L. PUB. POLY 29, 47-48 (2003); Edward R. Armstrong, Note, Family Law-Putative Fathers
and the Presumption of Legitimacy—Adams and the Forbidden Fruit: Clashes Between the Presump-
tion of Legitimacy and the Rights of Putative Fathers in Arkansas, 25 U. ARK. Lri-rm: ROCK L.
REv. 369, 371-72 (2003).
269 Hubin, supra note 268, at 47-50; Armstrong, supra note 268, at 372.
270 See Michael 1-I, v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1989) (upholding California's
conclusive presumption of paternity statute).
271 Armstrong, supra note 268, at 373.
279 See generally C.S. Patrinelis, Annotation, What Amounts to Recognition Within Statutes
Affecting the Status or Rights of Illegitimates, 33 A.L.R.2d 705 (1954).
273 Smith v. Mitchell, 202 S.W.2d 979, 981 (Tenn. 1947); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 287 cmt. a (1971).
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responsibilities of legal parenthood, including the right to custody
and visitation. 274
Sarah's task will be to convince the forum state to recognize the
status of legitimacy and the parent-child relationship created by the
same-sex marriage, even if it will not recognize the marriage. Prece-
dent supports this approach. In Peirce v. Peirce, the Illinois Supreme
Court considered a petition to inherit brought by the son of the de-
cedent's second wife.275 The decedent married the petitioner's
mother while he was still married to his first wife; his second wife was
unaware of his preexisting marriage. 276
 Although the decedent later
divorced his first wife, he did not go through a subsequent formal
marriage ceremony with his second wife. 277 The petitioner claimed to
be legitimate based on the common law marriage that existed in Ne-
vada after the decedent's divorce from his first wife. 278 The Illinois
Supreme Court agreed, even though Illinois law did not recognize
common law marriages contracted in other jurisdictions. 279
 The court
stated the following:
We are not called upon to recognize the common law or
however designated marriage of Era Peirce and deceased in
Nevada as valid, contrary to the public policy of this State.
We do, however, recognize the effect of the attainment of
marital status under the laws of Nevada in so far as it oper-
ates to make the children legitimate. 28°
A Pennsylvania case, In re George Estate, made the point even more
strongly, in a case involving a child of a bigamous marriage, who had
been legitimated in Ohio, seeking to take under a trust being admin-
istered in Pennsylvania:
274 Hardy v. Arcemont, 444 S.E.2d 327, 329 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). Sec generally Donald M.
Zupanec, Annotation, Effect, in Subsequent Proceedings, of Paternity Findings or Implications in
Divorce or Annulment Decree or in Support or Custody Order Made Incidental Thereto, 78 A.1„R.3d
846 (1977) (considering the effect of paternity findings and citing relevant cases).
2" 39 N.E.2d 990, 991 (III. 1942).
2" Id.
277 Id. at 991-92.
278 Id. at 992.
274 Id. at 993.
288
 Peirce, 39 N.E.2d at 993; sea Succession of Caballero v. Executor, 24 La. Ann. 573,
577 (1872) (recognizing legitimation of child born to interracial couple married in Ha-
vana but residing in Louisiana); of Franklin, 62 N.E. at 83 (citing Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind.
129, 137 (1884), and stating that the presumption in favor of marriage and the legitimacy
of children is one of the strongest known to the law, and in favor of a child asserting its
legitimacy this presumption applies with peculiar force").
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[A] recognition of the legitimacy of Mrs. Downey does not
per se involve a recognition of the lawfulness of the acts of
the parents or approve of their wrongdoing. The Ohio stat-
ute certainly does not condone the parents' conduct. A for-
tiori a recognition of the status of a child born of a bigamous
union does not involve a recognition of the lawfulness of the
conduct of the parents. The statute concerns itself simply
and exclusively with the rights of innocent children."'
The pertinence of this language to our case is clear: a court in a
DOMA jurisdiction can view the child as legitimate, and thus the
same-sex partner as a legal parent, without recognizing or validating
the marriage or condoning the relationship. 282
In some states, Sarah would be able to rely on statutes that ad-
dress this issue. For example, Illinois prohibits marriage between two
individuals of the same sex, but also provides that "children born or
adopted of a prohibited or common law marriage are legitimate"'
Likewise, Montana declares same-sex marriage prohibited, but also
provides that "[c] hildren born of a prohibited marriage are legiti-
mate."284 Of course, Andrea might argue that such statutes would not
apply because Madeleine was not "born or the marriage because
both parents are not biologically related to her. On the other hand, by
that reasoning, children who were conceived by artificial insemination
with the putative husband's consent also would not be children "born
of the marriage" if the marriage were declared invalid, an interpreta-
tion courts seem unlikely to adopt. Moreover, the law has long recog-
nized parenthood created by marriage, rather than biology, in estab-
lishing paternity. 285
In the absence of specific statutory instruction, courts will look to
the choice of law principles operative in their jurisdiction. Although a
variety of choice of law regimes exists, as we shall see shortly, the ques-
tion of legitimacy, like marriage, appears to have developed its own
rules apart from the general system governing choice of law in a par-
281 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 334, 338 (Orph. Ct. 1955).
282 See id.
288 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212(a) (5), (c) (West 1999). This provision was en-
acted subsequent to Peirce.
284 MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401(1)(d), (3) (2003); see COLO. REV. STAT § 19-2-110
(2003) (declaring children of prohibited marriages legitimate).
286 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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.ficular state. 286 In most jurisdictions, the legitimacy of the child is de-
termined by the rule of "the personal law of the child" rather than the
law where the property is located. 287 Identifying the personal law of
the child can become quite complicated. Indeed, the American Law
Reports annotation on the subject identifies at least ten possibili-
ties;288 however, any of these approaches would lead to the same result
in our hypothetical. The personal law of the child for determining the
status of legitimacy and thus the existence of the parent-child rela-
tionship would be the place where the marriage took place, because
that is also the place where Andrea and Sarah were domiciled and
Madeleine was born. The Second Restatement leads to the same result,
declaring that
[t] he child will usually be held legitimate if this would be his
status under the local law of the state where either (a) the
parent was domiciled when the child's status of legitimacy is
claimed to have been created or (b) the child was domiciled
when the parent acknowledged the child as his own. 289
286 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) (W CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) cmt. c (1971) (noting
that courts have evolved rules accommodating the conflicting values of the general rule in
certain areas); Estate of Ortiz, 383 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (Surrog. Ct. 1976) (applying the pre-
vailing rule that place of a child's birth determines legitimacy, but using a "center of grav-
ity" or "interest analysis" test for tort and contract disputes).
287 C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Conflict of Laws as to Legitimacy or Legitimation or as to Rights
of Illegitimates, as Affecting Descent and Distribution of Decedent's Estate, 87 A.L.R.2d 1274 § 2(a)
(1963). Compare In re Blanco Estate, 323 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (applying
"minority rule" which applies law of situs, rather than personal law, to determine who can
inherit), and Marvel, supra, § 5, with In re Estate of Dauenhauer, 535 P.2d 1005, 1006
(Mont. 1975) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6, 287-288 (1971);
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 137-141 (1934)).
288
 The American Law Reports annotation lists the following approaches to identifying
the personal law of the child:
(1) [T] he state in which the marriage is celebrated[;] (2) the state in which
the father or mother is domiciled (a) at the time of the intermarriage or (h) at
the time of the birth of the child[;] (3) the state of the birth of the child or
(where the alleged ground of legitimation is acknowledgment of the child
without intermarriage)[;] (4) the state in which the acts of acknowledgment
were performed[;] (5) the state of the domicil of the father at the time he per-
formed those acts[;] (6) the state of domicil of the father at the time of time
child's birth [;1 (7) the state of the child's birth or (when the alleged ground of
illegitimacy is the invalidity of the marriage, of the parents) [;1 (8) the state
where the marriage was celebrated 1;1 (9) the state where the parents were
domiciled at the time of celebration[;] (10) the state where the child was born.
Marvel, supra note 287, § 2(a).
289 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or CONFLICT OF LAWS § 287(2) (1971).
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The rule does leave room for the forum jurisdiction to decline to
apply the personal law of the child if it would "contravene ... public
policy or offend against good morals."299
 However, courts typically
have found that recognition of the status of legitimacy does not of-
fend public policy, even if the marriage would do so, and even in cases
involving widely disapproved forms of marriage like bigamy and inter-
racial marriage. 291 The case of George Estate, quoted above, addressed
this contention. 292
 The court there recognized the legitimacy of a
daughter born of a bigamous marriage, who would have been consid-
ered legitimate in the state of her birth, Ohio, though not if she had
been born in the forum state, Pennsylvania. 293
 The court identified
important policies underlying this result, recognizing a "larger and
more far-reaching consideration of public policy" was at stake. 294
 It
hesitated to
ignore the status acquired by Mrs. Downey at birth ... ex-
cept under the pressures of much stronger considerations
than any existing in this case.... [For ti he matter of per-
sonal status, lawfully acquired in one jurisdiction, is a thing
which ought not to be lightly interfered with or ignored.293
The court provided the following explanation:
"It would be in the highest degree inconvenient if a status of
this sort, once established, were liable to fluctuation and
change with time, place, or circumstance. Hence, when
these relations are once established by the proper law, they
remain, in general, fixed and unchangeable, into whatsoever
countries the parties may wander, or wheresoever the ques-
tion may arise."296
29°
 George Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d at 337.
291
 Succession of Cabellero, 24 La. Ann. at 575-77 (involving interracial marriage); Green
v. Kelley, 118 N.E. 235, 236-37 (Mass. 1918) (exemplifying bigamy); George Estate, 4 Pa. D.
& C.2d at 338-39; see Eubanks v. Banks, 34 Ga. 407, 417-18 (1866) (considering bigamy
and citing a case in accord involving incestuous marriage). Contra In re Bruington's Estate,
289 N.Y.S. 725, 731 (Sur. Ct. 1936) (refusing to recognize children of bigamous second
marriage as legitimate because against public policy).
292
 4 Pa. D. & C.2d at 337-38.
293 Id. at 339.
294 Id.
293 Id.
296 Id. (quoting RALEIGH C. MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS, OR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL.
LAW 212 (1901)).
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Granted, we are seeking here not to maintain the status of legiti-
macy for inheritance purposes, but to afford the parent and child the
opportunity to continue their relationship. Some might argue these
purposes are distinguishable, and that "stronger considerations" justify
a state in refusing to recognize the status created by a same-sex mar-
riage to support a claim for custody or visitation. But what would those
considerations be? Possibilities include protecting the biological parent
from claims by a partner which infringe upon the parent's constitu-
tional right to control her child's upbringing and expressing the state's
disapproval of same-sex marriage. The first concern does not carry
weight because One parent does not enjoy superior rights to the child's
other parent,297 and our claim is that the marriage created a full-
fledged parent-child relationship which survives regardless of the valid-
ity of the marriage. By this reasoning, Troxel v. Granville should not con-
stitute an unassailable barrier to this approach.298
 In Troxel, the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down a Washington third-party visitation statute
which permitted "[a] ny person" to petition for visitation "at any time." 29`9
In a plurality opinion, the Court found the "breathtakingly overbroad"
statute to infringe the parent's fundamental right to rear her chil-
dren.") After the death of her children's father, to whom she was never
married, Tommy Granville and the paternal grandparents, the Troxels,
failed to agree on the grandparents' visitation."' The grandparents pe-
titioned for visitation under the statute, and the trial court granted the
petition, finding that visitation was in the children's best interests."2 In
the plurality's view, parents are presumed to act in their children's best
interests, and their views regarding visitation are entitled to "special
weight."303 The plurality also emphasized that Granville had offered to
allow some continued visitation, rather than cut the grandparents off
from the children completely."4
The fractured nature of the Troxel decision as well as the narrow-
ness of its holding have created much uncertainty about the parame-
297 See. e.g., ALA. Cola § 30-3-2(a) (1989); CA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3(a) (1) (1998); IN1).
CODE § 31.17-2-8 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (Mich ie 2000).
298 See generally 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
299 Id. at 67-68.
300 Id.
391 Id. at 60-61.
302 Id. at 61.
303 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70.
304 Id. at 71.
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ters of third-party visitation. 905
 Our claim here, though, is that Sarah
seeks custody or visitation not as a third party, but as a co-equal parent
based on the parent-child relationship created by the marriage, even
if invalidated."6
 Indeed, if the marriage renders Sarah a parent, the
state has just as much interest in protecting her constitutional rights
as Andrea's, suggesting that recognition of Sarah's rights, rather than
obliteration of them, would better serve the state's goal. Moreover,
the primary concern of the Troxel plurality—the risk of an unwar-
ranted intrusion into the parents' fundamental right to make deci-
sions regarding their children—simply is not implicated in this situa-
tion. In our hypothetical case, the biological parent already has ceded
her exclusive parental role by marrying her partner, conceiving a
child, and raising the child together." 7
 As the Rhode Island Supreme
Court noted in recognizing standing of a lesbian co-parent to enforce
a visitation agreement with the biological mother in Rubano, "Di-
Cenzo rendered her own parental rights with respect to this boy less
exclusive and less exclusory than they otherwise would have been had
she not by word and deed allowed Rubano to establish a parental
bond with the child and then agreed to allow reasonable visitation: 1°8
By contrast, Tommy Granville never had agreed to nor had encour-
aged the Troxels' assumption of a parental role with her children, nor
had they assumed such a role."9
 As Nancy Polikoff has obsefved,
3°5 Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess!, 102 CoLum. L.
REv. 337, 371, 392-407 (2002); James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children's Existing Rights in
State Decision Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL •I's. J. 845, 973-78
(2003); Rachel Ary, Note, Troxel v. Granville: The Constitutionality of State Statutes Permitting
Third-Parties to Petition for lisitation with a Child, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 409, 410-11 (2002); see
infra notes 441-452 and accompanying text (discussing co-parent's right to seek custody or
visitation as a third party).
306 See Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 303 (Me. 2000) (finding constitutional the
awarding of visitation to grandparents acting as parents based on best interests standard);
Liebner v. Simcox, 834 A.2d 606, 612 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (concluding Troxel not control-
ling when person acting in loco parentis seeks visitation); Rubano, 759 A.2d at 974-77 (hold-
ing that biological parent's agreement to have lesbian partner assume de facto parent status
supported standing for partner to seek visitation). But see In m Nelson, 825 A.2d 501, 504
(N.H. 2003) (declining to equate third person acting in loco parentis with natural or adop-
tive parent).
307 See Parentage of L.B., 89 P.3d at 285 (noting that when legal parent consents to and
fosters another's development of parent-child relationship, parent's constitutional rights
not infringed).
538 759 A.2d at 976.
538
 In addition, Granville had not terminated all visitation with the Troxels. In the typi-.
cal co-parenting dispute, one parent has cut off all visitation with the other. See supra notes
125-127 (citing cases).
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Troxel does not define parenthood nor affect the ability of
states to do so. Legally unrecognized lesbian mothers are
parents. Such recognition obviates any possible "third party"
problem within the meaning of Troxel; it guarantees equal
status for both parents, not a lesser status that confers lesser
rights and responsibilities.310
The argument is even stronger in our situation, for our co-parent was
a legally recognized parent in her home state. Consequently, recog-
nizing Sarah's parental rights does not offend the policy of protecting
a parent's fundamental rights.
The second possible concern—expressing disapproval of gay rela-
tionships—even if permissible, cannot outweigh the critical need for
certainty in this area 811 Indeed, the arguments in favor of recognizing
the status of legitimacy and the parent-child relationship are much
more compelling in this context than in the question of inheritance. In
those cases, only money is at stake. In these cases, failure to recognize
the relationship likely will leave both a child and a parent emotionally
scarred, in addition to depriving the child of the crucial and more tan-
gible benefits of the parent-child relationship, such as child support,
health benefits, and the right to inherit from the second parent.
e. Parental Rights Under the Choice of Law Regimes
Many of these arguments also apply if we move beyond the le-
gitimation cases to consider the analysis under broader choice of law
systems. Our task would be made simpler if states adhered to one par-
ticular approach in deciding choice of law questions. Unfortunately,
no such consensus exists. States may apply one of at least four differ-
ent approaches to deciding these questions.m
The first Restatement of the Conflict of Laws ("First Restatement") sets
forth rigid, mechanical rules for deciding choice of law questions in
an effort to establish guidelines outside the forum's substantive law.313
310
 Nancy D. Polikoff, The Impact of Troxel v. Granville on Lesbian and Gay Parents, 32
RUTGERS U. 825,834 (2001); see Dolgin, supra note 305, at 401-412 (describing cases of de
facto parents as "easily distinguished" from Trani).
3" See supra notes 265-267 and accompanying text (discussing animus toward gays as a
justification for denying recognition to the marriage); infra notes 340-343 and accompany-
ing text (discussing shift in family law toward acceptance of gay parents generally).
312
 Scholars have grouped the states in different ways. Compote Cox, supra note 18, at
1083-97 (identifying four approaches), with Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United
States, 38 1-InsTuyns 14. 1041,1115-16 (1987) (identifying six approaches currently in use).
313 Cox, supra note 18, at 1084.
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These guidelines were based on a "vested rights" theory which saw the
forum court's role as "enforc[ing] existing rights created under that
foreign law."314
 Followed by approximately fifteen states, the First Re-
statement provides that the forum state should apply the law of the
place "where the key event leading to the plaintiff's cause of action
occurred."515
 In this case, the key event was the creation of the parent-
child relationship, albeit through the marriage." 6 Under the First Re-
statement, states may refuse to enforce another state's law which vio-
lated the forum state's public policy," 7
 but the policy analysis above
would apply here as well and should lead to the conclusion that rec-
ognition of parental rights does not offend public policy." 8
The Second Restatement, followed by approximately half the states,
sets forth a multifactorial analysis to determine choice of law." 9 In the
absence of statutory directive, the court seeks to identify the state with
the most significant relationship by considering the following:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b)
the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of
other interested states and the relative interests of those
states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the
protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies
underlying the particular field of law, (0 certainty, predict-
ability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determi-
nation and application of the law to be applied.32°
How do these factors apply to the recognition of the same-sex part-
ner's parental rights in a jurisdiction which does not otherwise recog-
nize the marriage?
One need of the interstate and international systems in this con-
text is to ensure a system that works well and that fosters "harmonious
relations between states."321 A rule that requires recognition of paren-
tal rights granted by one state, in another, would facilitate these goals
by providing uniformity. Some might argue, though, that it would un-
dermine harmonious relations by forcing states opposed to same-sex
314 Id.
315 /d. at 1083-84.
316 Cf. Holmes v. Traweek, 577 S.E.2d 777, 779 (Ga. 2003) (noting that unwed mother
entitled to custody has "vested right" in relationship with her child).
517 Fruehwald, supra note 240, at 818.
318 See supra notes 294-310 and accompanying text.
319 Cox, supra note 18, at 1096.
325 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971).
321 Id. § 6.2 cmt. d.
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marriage to allow it. While that argument might have some force in
questions involving the validity of the marriage per se, it has much
less currency when dealing with the parental rights question. In the
latter case, while most states do not recognize same-sex partners as
legal parents, neither do they have statutes explicitly expressing a pol-
icy against such rights.
We have already discussed two possible relevant policies of the
forum—protecting the biological parent's rights and disapproving of
same-sex relationships. In addition, the forum might have an interest
in avoiding unequal treatment of its domiciles. The forum would be
awarding parental rights to a same-sex partner who had married in
Massachusetts or Canada, but now lived in the forum, while citizens of
the forum could not obtain similar rights. This disparity might en-
courage more evasionary marriages, as citizens of the forum state seek
to acquire parental rights by marrying in Massachusetts or Canada.
The next factor considers the relevant policies and interests of
other interested states.322 In our hypothetical, the state where the
marriage took place and where all parties were domiciled at the time
and remained for some time thereafter certainly would qualify as an-
other interested state. Massachusetts's policy in allowing same-sex
marriage is clear—to ensure equality for its citizens under the Massa-
chusetts Constitution. 323 The court stated the following:
The marriage ban works a deep and scarring hardship on
a very real segment of the community for no rational rea-
son.... Limiting the protections, benefits, and obligations
of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples violates the basic
premises of individual liberty and equality under law pro-
tected by the Massachusetts, Constitution. 324
Moreover, the court specifically highlighted the disadvantages that the
same-sex marriage ban works on children:
Excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage ... pre-
vent[s] children of same-sex couples from enjoying the im-
measurable advantages that flow from the assurance of "a
stable family structure in which children will be reared, edu-
cated, and socialized."
322 See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
3" Goodridgc, 798 N.E.2d at 949.
324 Id, at 968.
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... It cannot be rational under our laws, and indeed it is
not permitted, to penalize children by depriving them of
State benefits because the State disapproves of their parents'
sexual orientation . 325
Similar concerns motivated the Canadian courts to legalize same-
sex marriages. 326
 In ruling that the ban on same-sex marriage violated
the equality rights of same-sex couples under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that exclud-
ing same-sex couples from the "fundamental social institution" of
marriage discriminates because it "perpetuates the view that same-sex
relationships are less worthy of recognition than opposite-sex rela-
tionships. In doing so, it offends the dignity of persons in same-sex
relationships."327 The court further noted that same-sex couples have
children and that they "should be able to benefit from the same stabi-
lizing institution as their opposite-sex counterparts." 328
Some might argue that once the parties leave Massachusetts or
Canada and make their domicile elsewhere, the interest of those juris-
dictions wanes. In fact, the jurisdiction's interests are more enduring.
First, Massachusetts's and Canada's interest in securing equality for
their citizens supports interstate recognition of the partner's parental
rights because an opposite-sex spouse in the same position would enjoy
such rights. 329
 Second, Massachusetts and Canada, as stated above, have
a strong interest in the welfare of children within their jurisdiction, and
continuing uncertainty regarding the durability of parental rights af-
forded by marriage to a same-sex couple would not further children's
best interests. 330 Partners whose rights are vulnerable might refrain
from fully assuming their parental role, for fear that their rights could
be easily abrogated by a move elsewhere. In addition, uncertainty puts
the child at risk of abandonment by the partner, without repercussions.
A partner who had been the sole support for a child born into the mar-
riage, for example, could deliberately move to a state that does not rec-
ognize the marriage and thereby potentially insulate herself from
325 Id. at 964 (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 325 (Gordy, J., dissenting)).
326 Halpern v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), f 2003] 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529,561-62 (Ont. Gt. App.).
322 Id.
128 kl. at 567.
329
 See Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 576 (Sosman, J., dissenting) (pointing out
that lack of recognition in other jurisdictions Is a difference that gives rise to a vast as-
sortment of highly tangible, concrete consequences" which means sante-sex couples who
marry will continue to have "a different status").
51) See supra notes 325-329 and accompanying text.
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claims for child support."' A child might even find herself orphaned if
the biological parent died and the forum state refused to recognize the
partner as a parent." 2
The next factor—the protection of justified expectations—argues
strongly in favor of recognizing parental rights. On the one hand,
someone who is deemed a legal parent under the law surely would ex-
pect to maintain that status, regardless of where she lived."3 On the
other hand, the precariousness of same-sex marriage in light of the
federal DOMA, the state DOMAs, and a proposed amendment to the
Constitution might suggest that any expectations regarding interstate
recognition of rights afforded by the marriage would not be justified. 334
While this argument might have some currency for the parents, it fails
to address the expectations that are most critical here—the child's. A
child of a same-sex marriage would likely have no inkling that the status
of one of her parents could be challenged if she moved to another
state.
The child's needs likewise lie at the heart of the next factor—the
underlying policies of the field of law. First, in every state, one can
find declarations that the "best interests of the child" are paramount
in a variety of contexts concerning the parent-child relationship."
331 She would not succeed in evading her responsibilities in all circumstances. The
Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, adopted in Massachusetts, pro-
vides for expansive long-arm jurisdiction enabling child support orders to be entered
against certain out-of-state parents. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209B, §§ 2, 7 (2002); see join...!
DEWrrr GREGORY ET AI,., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW § 9.06[F] [3] [IA, [4] (2d ed. 2001)
(discussing interstate child support enforcement mechanisms).
332 cf. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Mass. 1993) (noting that where one
parent dies, children of lesbian relationships "often remain in legal limbo for years while
their future is disputed in the courts"); Roberson v. Pickett, 900 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex.
App. 1995) (affirming that under the Texas Family Code, a child without a legally recog-
nized father was orphaned when the mother died).
3" Cf. KM., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 151 (commenting that 'Ube law requires a fixed stan-
dard that gives prospective parents some measure of confidence in the legal ramifications
of their procreative actions").
334 See Si. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003).
335 See, e.g., J.A.H. v. Calhoun County Dep't of Human Res., 865 So, 2d 1228, 1231-32
(Ala. Civ. App. 2003); M.W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 20 P.3d 1141, 1144 {Alaska
2001); State v. Bean, 851 P.2d 843, 845 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Blackwood v. Floyd, 29 S.W.3d
694, 696 (Ark. 2000); In re J.C., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 677 (Ct. App. 2002); N.A.H., 9 P.3d
at 357; Ford v. Ford, 789 A.2d 1104, 1111, 1113 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); In re AIL, 842 A.2d
674, 684 (D.C. 2004); Rose v. Ford, 861 So. 2d 490, 493 (Ha. Din. Ct. App. 2003); Bodne v,
Bodne, 588 S.E.2d 728, 729 (Ga. 2003); Doe v. Doe, 44 P.3d 1085, 1096-97 (Flaw. 2002);
Roberts v. Roberts, 64 P.3d 327, 329-30 (Idaho 2003); In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 791
N.E.2d 532, 544 (Ill. 2003); In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1255, 1257 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004); In re K.C., 660 N.W.2d 29, 33, 35 (Iowa 2003); In re Marriage of !layman, 47
P.3d 413, 415 (Kan. 2002); Amin v. Bakhaty, 798 So. 2d 75, 82-83 (La. 2001); Rodrigue v.
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Second, most, if not all, states have expressed a policy in favor of "fre-
quent and continuing contact with both parents." 338 Third, family law
seeks to promote stability and continuity of family relationships. 337
Fourth, family law prefers two parents, rather than one, when possi-
ble.338
 Fifth, family law aims to encourage parental responsibility.
Brewer, 667 A.2d 605, 606 (Me. 1995); Stubbs v. Colandrea, 841 A.2d 361, 370 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2004); In re Custody of Kali, 792 N.E.2d 635, 639-42 (Mass. 2003); Wino v.
Winn, 593 N.W.2d 662, 690 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999), vacated and remanded by 595 N.W.2d 826
(Mich. 1999); In re Welfare ofJ.R., 655 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2003); In re Adoption of D.N.T.,
843 So. 2d 690, 719 (Miss. 2003) (Graves, J., dissenting); Harmon v. Headley, 95 S.W.3d
154, 159 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); In is AI., 77 P.3d 266, 269 (Mont. 2003); Claborn
Claborn, 673 N.W.2d 533, 540 (Neb. 2004); In re Guardianship of D.R.G., 62 P.3d 1127,
1132 (Nev. 2003); In re Pasquale, 777 A.2d 877, 879-80 (N.H. 2001); In re State ex rd. Chil-
dren Youth & Families Dept, 32 P.3d 790, 796 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001); In re Marino S., 795
N.E.2d 21, 27 (N.Y. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1059 (2003); In re Shepard, 591 S.E.2d 1, 5
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004), re-view denied sub nom., In re D.S., 599 S.E.2d 42 (N.C. 2004); Peek v.
Berning, 622 N.W.2d 186, 189 (N.D. 2001); Willis v. Willis, 775 N.E.2d 878, 889 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2002); In re Baby Girl L., 51 P.3d 549, 554-55 (Okla. 2002); In is Marriage of
Compton, 33 P.3d 369, 372-73 (Or. Ct. App. 2001); Liebner, 834 A.2d at 610; Africano v.
Castelli, 837 A.2d 721, 728 (R.I. 2003); Doe v. Ward Law Firm, 579 S.E.2d 303, 307 (S.C.
2003); in re Guardianship of T.L.R., 645 N.W.2d 246, 250 (S.D. 2002); Blair v. Badenhope,
77 S.W.3d 137, 149 (Tenn. 2002); In re Shockley, 123 S.W.3d 642, 652 (Tex. App. 2003); In
is Adoption of B.T.D., 68 P.3d 1021, 1029 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Habecker v. Giard, 820
A.2d 215, 219 (Vt. 2003); Norfolk Div. of Soc. Servs. v. Hardy, 593 S.E.2d 528, 532 (Va, Ct.
App. 2004); In re Placement of Rj., 5 P.3d 1284, 1287, 1288 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); Hager
v. Hager, 591 S.E.2d 177, 181 (W. Va. 2003) (Davis, J., dissenting); In in Termination of
Parental Rights to Prestin TB., 648 N.W.2d 402, 410-12 (Wis. 2002); Drake v. McCulloh, 43
P.3d 578, 584 (Wyo. 2002).
336
 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3004 (West 2004); accord ALA. CODE § 30-3-150 (1998); ALASKA
STAT. § 25.20.060 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-408 (West 2000); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9.13-101(b) (1)(B) (Michie Supp. 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129 (2003); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-914 (Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2) (b) (1) (West Supp. 2004);
Immo CODE § 32-717B (Michie 1996); lowA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West 2001); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:335 (West 2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(5)(c) (2004); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 452.375 (West 2009); Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.051 (West 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 112 (West Supp. 2004); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5302 (West 2001); UTAil Coon
ANN. § 30-3-10 (Supp. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (Michie 2004).
337 E4., ARIZ. REV. ST/•1', ANN, § 8-515.03 (West Supp. 2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9.28-601
(Michie 2002); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-3 (West Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-4-212 (2003); NER. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1308 (Michie 1999); OHIO REV, CODE ANN.
§ 3107.161; OKLA. STAT'. ANN. lit, 10, § 1116.3; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., ch. 53, subch. B,
Uniform Law Comments Prefatory Note; UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-33.
"8 E.g., Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 568-69 (Cal. 2003), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1220 (2004); Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399; see Helen M. Alvare. , The Case for Regulating Col-
laborative Reproduction: A Children's Rights Perspective, 40 HARV, J. ON LEG1S. 1, 49 (2003);
Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and
Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 301 (1998); Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men
Creating Families Through Surro-Gay Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POO!' & L. 183, 236 n.248 (1995); Kathryn E. Kovacs, Recognizing Gay
and Lesbian Families: Marriage and Parental Rights, 5 LAW & SEXUALITY 513, 537 (1995); Ira
2004]	 Interstate Recognition of Same,Sex Parents	 59
Every state has laws providing that both parents have an obligation to
provide financial support, and parents who willfully fail to provide
such support or otherwise neglect or abuse their children can be sub-
ject to criminal penalties. 339
The only policies that potentially undercut the claim for recogni-
tion are those preferring heterosexual parents and protecting the
rights of biological or adoptive parents against third parties. As al-
ready discussed, the latter does not apply, because our hypothetical
partner Sarah is not a third party, but rather a parent, and the bio-
logical parent freely consented to her acquisition of parental rights by
marrying her. 340 The former policy has weakened considerably in
most jurisdictions. While in the past, many jurisdictions discriminated
openly against gay and lesbian parents in custody determinations, to-
day most states take sexual orientation into account. only if the other
parent demonstrates a nexus between the parent's sexual conduct
and harm to the child. 341 A smaller group of states allows the courts to
consider the conduct, but does not require a denial of custody. 342
Only a handful of states retain a rule that homosexuality renders a
parent per se unfit. Moreover, these states may well soften their stance
in light of Lawrence, because the basis for the rule in the past has
been, at least in part, that homosexual conduct was a crime in these
jurisdiction 013
C. Lu pu, The Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U. Cut. L. REV. 1317, 1332
(1994); Susan C. Stevenson-Popp, Have Loved You in My Dreams": Posthumous Reproduction
and the Need for Change in the Uniform Parentage Act, 52 CA • 111. U. L. REV. 727, 736 (2003).
SN LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TErrELBAuts, FAMILY LAW 680-82 (2d ed. 2000); Twila L.
Perry, The "Essentials of Marriage": Reconsidering the Duty of Support and Services, 15 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 1, 13 (2003); Laure Ashley Culbertson, Comment, Article 613 of the Louisiana
Children's Code: Child Abuse Investigations in the Twilight of the Fourth Amendment, 55 LA. L.
REV. 361, 363 (1994).
34° See supra notes 297-310 and accompanying text (distinguishing Troxel).
341 NAT'L CAR. FOR LESBIAN Ricans, CUSTODY CASES INVOLVING LESBIAN AND GAY
PAREN'IS: AN INFORMATION SHEET (2000), available at http://www.nclrights.org/publica
tions/pubs/cc1000.pdf (last updated Oct. 1, 2000); Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How
the Law Fails Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children, 71 !rm. U. 623, 635 & n.67 (1996).
342 Shapiro, supra note 341, at 639.
343 The states that retain a rule that homosexuality renders a parent per se unfit are
Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, and Virginia. See Ex parte .J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala.
1998) (citing ALA. ConE § 13A-6-65 (1975), which made deviate sexual conduct a misde-
meanor, to support change in custody back to former husband from lesbian mother); Ex
parse D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998) (citing ALA. ConE § 13A-6-65(a) (3), which
made lesbianism illegal, to restrict lesbian mother's visitation and to uphold custody award
to father); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 243-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Mu. REV. STAT.
§ 566.090(3) (1979), which made "deviate sexual intercourse with another person of the
sante sex" a crime, in upholding custody award and visitation arrangement in favor of fa-
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The next factor—certainty, predictability, and uniformity—points
toward recognition of the parent-child relationship. Courts have long
acknowledged the importance of providing certainty for marriages
because of the rights to property, benefits, and legitimacy bound up
with that status. 344
 The need for certainty and predictability is even
more compelling for this issue. Here, as we have seen, a child's emo-
tional as well as financial well-being is at stake. Whatever risks the par-
ents face should the marriage not be recognized pale in comparison
to the damage a child will suffer if cut off permanently from one of
her parents. Nor would a rule of non-recognition serve these goals
because, as discussed in the previous Section, the states without DO-
MAs likely will view the marriage as valid. Indeed, refusal to recognize
the partner's parental status would encourage forum shopping; a bio-
logical parent wishing to ensure no claims for custody or visitation by
the other parent could purposely move to a jurisdiction where neither
the marriage nor the spouse's parental rights would be recognized. It
seems clear, however, from a choice of law perspective that neither
rule would lead to absolute certainty, predictability, or uniformity be-
cause states with either "category two" or super-DOMAs will follow a
statutory directive likely requiring non-recognition. 345 This dilemma
should not prove dispositive in "category one" DOMA jurisdictions. As
comment (i) to section 6 of the Second Restatement acknowledges,
courts should aim to develop a good rule of law, rather than adhere to
existing rules for the sake of uniformity. 346
The last factor—ease and determination of the law to be ap-
plied—supports Sarah's claim. Identifying Sarah as a parent need not
require complicated legal analysis. The court merely needs to ascer-
tain that she and Andrea married in Massachusetts or Canada and
that the spouse of a woman artificially inseminated is deemed a legal
parent of the resulting child for all purposes. Analysis of the factors
listed in section 6 of the Second Restatement thus leads to the conclu-
ther against lesbian mother); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995) (citing
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (1950), which made homosexual conduct a felony, to support
custody award to grandparent against lesbian mother); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694
(Va. 1985) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (1950) in support of custody award to mother
against homosexual father); NAT I. Cm. FOR Les MAN 10mi-is, supra note 341.
344 Doe v. Roe, 704 P.2d 940, 942 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985) (referencing and quoting
Cleveland v, Cleveland, 559 P.2d 744, 748 (Haw. 1977), which "deem[ed] the certainty of
marital status to be an important public policy," and "held that the 'policy of finality with
respect to decrees terminating marriage ... is strongly expressed in the statutes .").
343 See infra notes 388-389, 439 and accompanying text.
346 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLic .r OF LAWS § 6 emt. i (1971).
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sion that even a state which has declared it will not recognize a same-
sex marriage can apply Massachusetts or Canadian law and acknowl-
edge Sarah's right, as a parent, to seek custody or visitation with the
child she planned for and parented since birth.
While no case law yet exists analyzing this question under the Sec-
ond Restatement approach (or any other), a Nevada court has con-
fronted a choice of law question concerning parental status. 347 Her-
manson v. Hermanson involved a custody dispute between a husband
and wife who were divorcing 348 Cindy married her husband, David, in
California, when she was six-months pregnant with a child by another
man.349 The couple lived together on and off for the first three years
of the child's life, in a volatile relationship marked by domestic vio-
lence perpetrated by David against. Cindy. 359 Cindy and James, the
child, subsequently moved to Iowa where she raised James alone. 351
When James was eight, Cindy moved to Las Vegas where she and
David attempted a reconciliation which lasted only a month. 352 Cindy
filed for divorce, alleging that there was no issue of the marriage, even
though David was named as the father on James's birth certificate. 353
David sought to be declared the father and to obtain visitation
rights.354 Blood tests subsequently proved conclusively that David was
not James's biological father. 355 Nonetheless, the trial court held that
David was conclusively presumed to be David's father based on the
California Evidence Code 8561 After a trial, the court awarded David
joint legal custody and liberal visitation rights. 357 On appeal, the Ne-
vada Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the trial court erred in ap-
plying California law, even though the parties married there and
James was born there.358 The court acknowledged that some courts
determine paternity according to the law of the child's birthplace. 359
It chose, instead, to apply the substantial relationship test: it would
apply the law of the state which had a substantial relationship with the
317
 Hermanson v. Hermanson, 887 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Nev. 1994).
3413 Id.
349 Id. at 1242.
359
 Id. at 1243.
351 Id.






 Hermanson, 887 P.2d at 1243.
358 Id.
359 Id. at 1244 tt.2.
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transaction if the transaction did not violate a strong public policy of
Nevada.36°
On its face, this precedent would seem to undercut Sarah's claim.
To the extent Hermanson stands for the proposition that a forum court
need not recognize parental rights lawfully acquired elsewhere, she
would argue that it was wrongly decided. However, a closer look at the
case suggests that it does not yield such a sweeping claim and can be
distinguished from our hypothetical case. First, the evidence code sec-
tion on which David relied had been repealed, bringing California's
public policy in line with Nevada's policy. 361 In both states, the pre-
sumption of paternity could be rebutted. 362 The court specifically
found that Nevada's public policy gave the child a right to bring a pa-
ternity action up until three years after the age of majority; in its view,
that right should not be abridged by a repealed California statute. 363
The court thus implicitly found that there was no existing conflict be-
tween California and Nevada law.364 Indeed, if the divorce had been
heard in California, the outcome may have been the same. 365 Al-
though the court did not discuss specifically the remaining Second Re-
360 Id. at 1244.
301
 Id. at 1244 n.3.
362
 Hermanson, 887 P.2d at 1244 n.3.
56' Id. at 1244.
364 See id.
565 The repeal of section 621 of the California Evidence Code actually did not abolish
the conclusive presumption of paternity; it remains codified at section 7540 of the Califor-
nia Family Code. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Stipp. 1991) (current version at CAI,. FAM.
CODE § 7540 (West 2004)). However, the presumption now can be rebutted by the mother
if she brings a motion within two years of the birth of the child and the biological father
has acknowledged paternity. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(c). Although David Hermanson
might have argued that neither of these conditions were met, he would not have prevailed
because he could not rely on the conclusive presumption in the first instance. That pre-
sumption applies only if the child is conceived when the husband and mother are married
and cohabiting. Brian C. v. Ginger K., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 298 (Ct. App. 2000). Here, the
parties married when the mother was already pregnant. Hermanson, 887 P.2d at 1242. Even
without the benefit of the conclusive presumption, however, David Hermanson would have
been deemed a presumed father under section 7611 of the California Family Code. See
CAL. Eon. CODE § 7611. The Nevada Supreme Court appears to have erred, however, when
it concluded that this presumption of paternity could be rebutted "at any time," See Her-
manson, 887 P.2d at 1244. Section 7630 of the California Family Code provides that an
action to declare the "nonexistence of the father and child relationship" may be brought
only if 'within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of relevant facts." CAL. FAM,
CODE § 7630. In Hermanson, the mother claimed that the husband knew from the start that
he was not the child's biological father. 887 P.2d at 1242. However, California courts might
nonetheless have refused to apply the presumption, finding that its underlying policies
were not served, which they have done on occasion. See, e.g., Steven W, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
538-39; County of Orange v. Leslie B., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797, 799 (Ct. App. 1993).
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statement factors, in addressing a claim by the husband for parental
status based on equitable estoppel, the court made other salient
points which distinguish the case from our hypothetical. 366 In Herman-
son, the husband had not had contact with the child for some years,
except for the attempted one-month reconciliation prior to the filing
for divorce. 367 Nor had he paid any significant support for the child. 368
In essence, he appeared at best to have acted as a stepparent many
years prior to the adjudication. 369 By contrast, in our hypothetical, the
non-biological parent undertook parental caretaking functions and
provided support for the child throughout. the child's life until her
spouse moved out.
The other two types of choice of law regimes include Brainerd
Currie's "governmental interest analysis" and Robert Leflar's "choice-
influencing considerations" or "better rule of law" analysis. 3" Few states
follow the governmental interest analysis. 3" Of these, only California
would fall within the category of cases we are discussing in this Section.
Under the governmental interests analysis, cases either present false
conflicts, true conflicts, or unprovided-for cases. 372 One commentator
suggests that any case in which both parties are now domiciliaries of the
forum presents a false conflict.573 This approach would allow the forum
to apply its law to our hypothetical situation. 574 However, no California
case explicitly declares that a true conflict requires parties with differ-
ent domiciles. Our situation, where the parent-child relationship was
formed in another state, might yield a "true conflict" if both states have
an interest in the case and if the applicable state laws differ.375 If a true
366 See Hermanson, 887 P.2d at 1244-45.
567 Id. at 1245.
" Id. Although not technically germane to either the choice of law or equitable es-
toppel claims, the history of violence perpetrated by David provides an additional reason
to avoid finding the husband to be the child's legal father.
369 See id. at 1243, 1295.
370 Cox, supra note 18, at 1083.
371
 Barbara Cox identifies four states that follow the government interest analysis—
California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey. Id. at 1093. Hawaii, however, appears to
follow the significant relationship or the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws approach,
and Massachusetts appears to follow Robert Letlar's rule. See Roxas v. Marcos, 969 P.2d
1209, 1235 n.16 (Haw. 1998); Lewis v. Lewis, 748 P.2d 1362, 1365 (Haw. 1988); Peters v.
Peters, 634 P.2d 586, 593-95 (Haw. 1981); Bushkin Assocs., Inc. V. Raytheon Co., 473
N.E.2d 662, 670 (Mass. 1985).
372 Cox, supra note 18, at 1090.
" See id.
374 See id.
575 See Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721, 725 (Cal. 1978); Scott
v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. Rptr. 920, 922 (Ct. App. 1984).
64	 Boston College Law Review
	 P.I.To 46:1
conflict does exist, the court then must evaluate the comparative im-
pairment to each state's interests and apply the law of the state whose
interests would suffer most. 376 Considering Sarah's hypothetical case,
California and Massachusetts arguably differ regarding the rights of
same-sex parents, with California refusing to grant standing to lesbian
co-parents and Massachusetts allowing same-sex couples to marry and
thus to gain full parental rights. 377
 However, California's A.B. 205 pro-
vides domestic partners parental rights equivalent to married persons,
completely deflating the argument that California's interests would be
impaired substantially by recognizing the grant of parental rights under
Massachusetts law) 78
 The interplay between A.B. 205 and California's
DOMA further complicates the analysis. On the one hand, A.B. 205
provides explicitly for recognition of domestic partner or equivalent
benefits from other states. 379
 On the other hand, A.B. 205 also
specifically excludes recognition of a same-sex marriage, presumably
out of deference to its DOMA.'m However, this distinction does not al-
ter our choice of law analysis regarding parental rights, because it is not
contingent on recognition of the marriage."'
As for Robert Leflar's approach, it resembles the Second Restatement
with an additional factor—the application of the better rule of law. 382 In
terms of the validity of the marriage per se, the determination of the
better law definitely would depend on one's perspective. Proponents of
same-sex marriage would argue that recognition is the better rule be-
cause it fosters equality, and opponents would contend that preserva-
tion of traditional marriage is the preferable rule. However, when the
issue is solely parental status, the better rule of law would seem to be
the one that fosters the best interests of the child because all states es-
pouse that policy. 383
 Of the two states with DOMAs that follow Leflar's
approach, only Minnesota potentially would qualify as a "category one"
376
 Scott, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
377
 See West, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160; Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 219; Curiale, 272 Cal.
Rptr. at 522; Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 569-72; Goodridg-e, 798 N.E.2d at 961, 970.
378 CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2004).
179
 Id. § 299.2.
386 Id. §§ 299.2, 308.5. Proposition 22 is codified in section 308.5 of the California Fam-
ily Code. Sec id. § 308.5.
381
 Moreover, a same-sex spouse could argue for parental status based on the EWA, as
discussed in supra notes 146-239 and accompanying text.
382 Cox, supra note 18, at 1096-97. The other factors include "(1) predictability of re-
sult, (2) maintenance of interstate and international order, (3) simplification of the judi- .
cial task, [and] (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests." Id.
383 See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
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DOMA state. 384 Its DOMA provides that a same-sex marriage is void and
that "contractual rights granted by virtue of the marriage ... are unen-
forceable in this state."383 Thus Sarah would have to argue that the pa-
rental rights she seeks are 1101 "contractual rights" granted by the mar-
riage to avoid application of the DOMA. 3" She has a reasonable chance
of succeeding with this argument, because the law generally considers
parenthood to be a status created by biological, marital, or social ties,
rather than one created by contract. 387
Despite some arguments to the contrary, then, we can see that
even in "category one" states with a DOMA, a parent in Sarah's posi-
tion has a colorable claim to parental status, and thus standing to pur-
sue custody and visitation under a best interests standard, by virtue of
the same-sex marriage. Unfortunately, in the "category two" states,
these arguments would likely be unavailable to her. These states have
DOMAs that explicitly deny recognition of the marriage for any pur-
pose and deny recognition of any of the benefits or rights arising from
the marriage. 3" One of these states, Louisiana, directly forecloses the
argument based on legitimacy by statute. Article 96 of Louisiana's Civil
Code provides that a null marriage nonetheless produces "civil effects"
in favor of the child of the parties, but expressly states that a same-sex
marriage "does not produce any civil effects."389 In these jurisdictions,
a co-parent seeking parental rights will likely need to pursue one or
more of the alternative strategies discussed in Parts III and IV. 3"
384
 The other state, Arkansas, has a "category two" type DOMA, which provides that the
marriage shall be void and "any contractual or other rights granted by virtue of that license
... shall be unenforceable in the Arkansas COWLS." ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208 (Michie
2002). Minnesota straddles the line between "category one" and "category two." MINN.
STA•. ANN. § 517.03 (West Stipp. 2004).
326 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.03.
396
 Were the DOMA to bar consideration of Sarah's status as a parent based on the
marriage, she could still petition for custody. See LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d at 168. But see
Kulla v. McNulty, 472 N.W.2d 175, 184 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (dismissing co-parent's peti-
tion for visitation for failure to establish basis for third-party visitation).
887 See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1234-35 (N.J. 1988) (invalidating surrogacy con-
tract for violating public policy by allowing parents to decide custody of child before birth,
without regard to best interests). But see Bernie D. Jones, Single Motherhood by Choice, Liber-
tarian Feminism, and the Uniform Parentage Act, 12 TEX..). WOMEN & L. 419, 440-49 (2003)
(arguing for the ability to determine parental rights by contract).
313a See supra note 87 (citing statutes).
389 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 96 (West 1999).
590 See infra notes 441-467 and accompanying text.
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B. Recognition of Parental Rights if the Couple Enters into a Civil Union or
Domestic Partnership
In this Section, I examine how the analysis changes if Andrea and
Sarah enter into a civil union in Vermont or a domestic partnership in
California rather than marry. Indeed, this may constitute the more
salient question for the moment as civil unions seem to be the com-
promise of choice for many, including the Massachusetts legislature,
and a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage is pending
in Congress. 391
 Ironically, in some states a civil union may actually
provide greater protection to the parental rights of the non-biological
parent than marriage would because most state DOMAs by their
terms only prohibit recognition of marriage.
DOMAs we have classified as "category one" or "two category"
speak only to recognition of "marriages."392
 By their express terms, nei-
ther a Vermont civil union nor a California domestic partnership is a
marriage 393
 The civil union statute defines marriage as the "legally rec-
ognized union of one man and one woman" while providing that per-
sons are eligible for the civil union if they are "of the same sex and
therefore excluded from the marriage laws." 394
 Legislative findings ac-
companying the bill further declare that "a system of civil unions does
not bestow the status of marriage. "595
 Likewise, California's domestic
partner statute provides that "[t] his section does not amend or modify
any provision of the California Constitution or any provision of any
991
 See Jonathan Finer, Massachusetts Moves to Ban Gay Marriage but Allow Unions, Wnsit.
PosT, Mar. 12, 2004, at A7 (discussing proposed amendment to Massachusetts Constitu-
tion); Greg Frost. Reuters, Lawmaker Eyes Simple Fix to Gay Marriage Spat, Apr. 15, 2004,
LEXIS, Mega News Library, REUNWS File {discussing poll showing fifty-one percent of
respondents favoring civil unions); Aly Sujo, 63% Nix Gay Nups—But Most Also Oppose
Amendment: Poll, N.Y. Pawl., Mar. 26, 2004, at 23, LEXIS, News Library, NYPOST File (dis-
cussing poll showing forty percent of respondents favor civil unions compared to thirty-
one percent favoring gay marriage). At the same time, challenges to the ban on same-sex
marriage are escalating and may eclipse adoption of civil union type statutes. See, e.g.,
ACLU to File Lawsuit for Gay Marriage Rights, TIMES UNION (Albany), Apr. 7, 2004, at B3,
2004 WLNR 745953; Chiang, supra note 19, at B3; Amy Fagan, House Moves Slowly on Mar-
riage: Panel to Examine Amendment in Series of Hearings, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2004, at A3;
Michael Hill, Quiet Ministers' Actions Speak Loudly, TIMES UNION (Albany), Apr. 17, 2004, at
B3, 2004 WLNR 637982; Andrew Kramer, Sides in Gay Marriage Fight File Briefs, COLUMBIAN
(Vancouver, Wash.), Apr. 15, 2004, at C5, 2004 WLNR 11256651.
592
 For "category one" states, see supra note 87. For "category two" states, see supra
note 88.
591
 See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297.5(j), 308.5 (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. III. 15, § 1201(4)
(2002); see also Cox, supra note 18, at 778; Sawyer, supra note 18, at 736.
394
 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201(4), 1202(2).
595 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91, § 1(10).
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statute that was adopted by initiative."398 This statement presumably
refers to section 308.5 of the California Family Code, codifying Proposi-
tion 22, which limited marriage in California to a man and a woman. 397
Consequently, Sarah can argue that the DOMAs simply do not apply to
bar recognition of her parental rights if she and Andrea entered into a
civil union in Vermont or a domestic partnership in California.
Two judicial decisions that have addressed the interstate recogni-
tion of a civil union provide mixed support for this conclusion. In
Burns v. Burns, a father sought and obtained an order of contempt
against his ex-wife, alleging that she violated a trial court order which
prohibited her from visiting with her children while cohabiting with
an adult to whom she was not married, which in this case was her fe-
male lover. 398 The mother argued that she had not violated the court
order since she and her lover were parties to a civil union in Ver-
mont.399 The appellate court affirmed, ruling that the civil union was
not a "marriage. "400
In Rosengarten, a party to a Vermont civil union sought to dissolve
the union in Connecticut.401 The trial court dismissed the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the civil union was nei-
ther a marriage nor any other category of family relations under
Connecticut's jurisdictional statutes.4°2 The appellate court affirmed,
reasoning, in part, that the civil union was not a marriage under the
Connecticut statutes or under Vermont law.'"
996 CAI.. FAm Coot § 297,5( j).
397 Id. § 308.5.
3°8 560 S.E.2d 47, 48 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
3°3 Id.
4°0 Id. at 48-49.
401 802 A.2d at 172.
402 Id.
403 Id. at 175. The Burns court made clear that under its DOMA, the civil union, if it
were a marriage, would not be recognized in Georgia. 560 S.E.2d at 49. In Rosengarten, the
court found that the trial court had no jurisdiction to dissolve the petitioner's civil union
as a "family relations matter" because a Connecticut statute approving same-sex adoptions
expressly refused to endorse or to authorize same-sex civil unions. 802 A.2d at 177, 182.
Neither of these conclusions, however, would preclude the court from recognizing the
"incidents" of the union or the parental status created thereby, as discussed in supra notes
240-267 and accompanying text.
Apparently, trial judges in three other states, Iowa, Texas, and West Virginia, have
granted a civil union "divorce," although one judge later reversed his decision after in terven-
don by the Texas Attorney General. NAT'!. Cia. FOR LESBIAN RIGIFIN, supra note 7; Jeffrey
Cottrill, The Gay Divorcees, DIVORCE MAGAZINE.COM, at http://WWW.dIVOITCMagaZille.001111/
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By contrast, a New York case that ruled in favor of a gay plaintiff
undercuts the claim that we can distinguish the civil union or domes-
tic partnership from a marriage under the mini-DOMAs. 404 In Langan,
the court ruled that a partner to a civil union was a "surviving spouse"
under the New York wrongful death statute. 405 Relying on the com-
prehensive nature of the rights provided by the civil union statute, the
court concluded that the civil union was "indistinguishable from mar-
riage, notwithstanding that the Vermont legislature withheld the title
of marriage from application to the union. "406 The court further
noted that under the Vermont statute, the plaintiff-partner was con-
sidered a "literal spouse ... not a functional or virtual one."107 New
York had not enacted a mini-DOMA, so the court concluded that the
plaintiff's spousal status would be recognized, giving the plaintiff
standing to sue for the wrongful death of his partner. 408
Same-sex partners in civil unions or domestic partnerships face a
quandary then. They continue to be denied access to marriage, and
thus full equality within their home states. Yet the extensive tangible
benefits provided by these laws may render these unions, in practical
terms, indistinguishable from marriage, and thus subject to non-
recognition under various state DOMAs. 409
The better argument would recognize that civil unions are not
marriages, and that their recognition would not contradict the letter
or the spirit of most state DOMAs. 41 ° An advisory opinion by the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts supports this conclusion•I!'
The justices there considered a question posed by the Massachusetts
Senate: whether a system of civil unions would be constitutional in
light of the court's ruling in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health. 412
'84 See Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
4415 Id.
4°8 Id. at 417-18.
407
 Id. at 422.
4°8 Id.
409 Indeed, the quandary has another dimension as well. From a broader perspective,
advocates for gay rights face the prospect of arguing for the congruency of the civil union
and marriage in certain contexts, for example, achieving "spousal" status in wrongful
death actions, while highlighting the dissimilarities in family law cases being fought in
DOMA jurisdictions.
410 Although this rule would leave the door open for dismissal based on jurisdictional
grounds, as in Rosengarten, this risk poses less of a concern in our situation, as family courts
generally have jurisdiction to consider disputes concerning custody of children. See supra
note 136 and accompanying text.
411 See Opinions of the fitstices, 802 N.E.2d at 569-72.
412 Id. at 566-67.
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The court concluded that it would not. 413 In doing so, the court rea-
soned as follows:
The bill's absolute prohibition of the use of the word "mar-
riage" by "spouses" who are the same sex is more than seman-
tic. The dissimilitude between the terms "civil marriage" and
"civil union" is not innocuous; it is a considered choice of lan-
guage that reflects a demonstrable assigning of same-sex,
largely homosexual, couples to second-class status.. • . It would
deny to same-sex "spouses" only a status that is specially recog-
nized in society and has significant social and other advan-
tages. 414
The granting of nearly identical tangible benefits by the civil union
could not save it under the Massachusetts Constitution because civil
marriage carries with it "intangible protections, benefits, rights, and
responsibilities."415 Even Justice Martha Sosman's dissenting opinion
supports this argument. 4" As she noted, same-sex couples cannot en-
joy the same rights as opposite-sex couples, even if they were allowed
to marry, because a substantial cadre of federal rights remain unavail-
able to same-sex couples under the federal DOMA and because, as we
have seen, many other states may refuse to recognize the marriage. 4"
This argument is consistent with the purposes behind the mini-
DOMAs. Most of the mini-DOMAs were passed in response to the
Baehr cases and the prospect • of Hawaii permitting same-sex mar-
riages;418 neither the Vermont civil union statute nor A.B. 205 even
114 Id. at 572.
414 Id. at 570.
416 Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
416 Opinions of theJustices, 802 N.E.2d at 575-76 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
417 Id. (Sosman, J., dissenting). These differences also would include same-sex part-
ners' rights or eligibility for federally-funded state programs. Id. (Sosman, J., dissenting).
"Justice Martha R. Sosman stated the following in her dissenting opinion:
It would be rational for the Legislature to give different names to the li-
cense accorded to these two groups, when the obligations they are undertak-
ing and the benefits they are receiving are, in practical effect, so very differ-
ent, and where, for purposes of the vast panoply of federally funded State
programs, State officials will have to differentiate between them.
Id. (Sosman, J., dissenting). This difference in treatment by the federal government and
other states would "give[] rise to a vast assortment of highly tangible, concrete conse-
quences." Id. at 576 (Sosmand, dissenting).
416 LA. CIV. COM:
 ANN. art. 86 (West 1999) (Legislative Intent: Traditional Marriage).
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existed at the time many of the DOMAs were passed.'" Moreover, as
we saw earlier, a number of the statutes contain specific expressions
which support the view that the laws were designed to preserve the
traditional institution of marriage, not to prevent any benefits from
being provided to same-sex couples. 420
Given the existence of cogent arguments on both sides of this
issue, we can expect to see courts reach different conclusions regard-
ing the equivalence of civil unions, domestic partnerships, and mar-
riages in addressing choice of law questions when civil union or do-
mestic partners seek rights in other jurisdictions:421
 If a state without a
DOMA equates the civil union or domestic partnership with marriage,
the analysis of the same-sex partner's parental rights laid out in Part
II.A.1 applies essentially as set forth. 422
 Even if a court were to view the
union or partnership as distinct from a marriage, that conclusion
should not substantially alter the analysis in the non-DOMA jurisdic-
tions either. For all the reasons stated in Part those jurisdictions
are likely to recognize the parental rights flowing from the solemniza-
tion of the relationship, whether by civil union, domestic partnership,
or marriage. 423
In the DOMA jurisdictions, however, a court's determination that
civil unions and domestic partnerships are not essentially inter-
changeable with marriages could affect the analysis in ways both posi-
tive and negative. On the positive side, a same-sex partner like Sarah
can argue that the union or partnership falls outside the scope of the
DOMA, leaving the court free to recognize the civil union and all of
the rights attendant to that status. The court then would apply which-
ever choice of law rules govern in its jurisdiction to determine
whether to recognize the union. But even though the DOMA would
not preclude recognition of the civil union per se, Sarah likely would
fare best by seeking recognition of the union's effects, focusing on
her parental rights, as we did in Part II.A.2.c. 424
 The policies in favor
414 See NATI. GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, supra note 12 (showing dates of adoption of
state DOMAs).
4" See supra notes 254-264 and accompanying text.
421 Sec Katie Eyer, Note, Related Within the Second Degree? Burns v. Burns and the Potential
Benefits of Civil Union Status, 20 YALE L. & Pol:v REV. 297, 297 (2002).
422 See supra notes 91-127 and accompanying text.
423 See supra notes 91-127 and accompanying text.
424 See supra notes 240-267 and accompanying text. Even the pro-gay opinion of the
Langan court consciously avoided a determination of the validity of the civil union per se,
preferring instead to evaluate its relevance to the precise issue under consideration. Sec
765 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
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of her parental rights are recognized widely, while an attempt to vali-
date the union per se could prove more difficult. Moreover, oppo-
nents could argue that the DOMA, although not technically disposi-
live on the question of civil union or partnership recognition,
nonetheless evinces a strong policy against providing marriage-like
rights to gays. Alternatively, if a court recognized the civil union or
partnership in its entirety, Sarah would be able to sue to dissolve the
union, just as she could in Vermont or California. The court then
would treat her as any other parent entitled to custody or visitation in
a divorce proceeding according to the best interests of the child stan-
dard. Pursuing this approach would avoid potential jurisdictional and
standing barriers to perfecting her claim.425
For this reason, it is worthwhile to recap briefly the most widely
followed choice of law regimes and to posit arguments for recognition
of the civil union or domestic partnership within those regimes. 426 Ac-
cording to the First Restatement, the forum state would apply the law of
the place where the most significant event leading to the cause of ac-
tion arose. 427 Here, that would be Vermont or California, the place
where both parties celebrated their solemnization and were domiciled
at the time.428 Under the Second Restatement, courts again would con-
sider a variety of factors to determine which law to apply. 429 The first
factor—the needs of the interstate and international systems—favors
recognition of the civil union or domestic partnership, at least in con-
trast to seeking marriage recognition, because only a few states have
expressed a policy against civil unions. 4" The second factor—the rele-
425 See supra notes 132-142 and accompanying text.
426 For an analysis of this issue in one state, see generally Elaine M. DeFranco, Com-
ment, Choice of Law: Will a Wisconsin Court Recognize a Vermont Civil Union, 85 MAN. L. REV.
251 (2001) (questioning whether a Wisconsin court would have to recognize a civil union
under its choice of law theories). The DOMA state following the governmental interests
analysis, California, already specifically provides for recognition of out-of-state civil unions
or partnerships. CAL. FAM. CODE § 299.2 (West 2004).
427 RESTATEMENT OF CoNritur of LAws §§ 121. 129 (1934).
428 See supra notes 313-318 and accompanying text.
429 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or OnaLtur or LAWS § 6(2) (1971). Minnesota and Ar-
kansas follow Robert Leflar's "better rule of law" approach, a variation of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws. See supra notes 382-387. On the one hand, both these states
have broad DOMAs; on the other hand, Minnesota already has granted standing to a les-
bian co-parent seeking custody based at least in part on an agreement with the mother.
LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d at 160-61. But sce Kulla, 472 N.W.2d at 184 (dismissing co-parent's
petition for visitation for failure to establish basis for third-party visitation).
4" See NEB. CoNsT. art. I, § 29; FLA, S'ta'r. ANN. § 741.212 (West Supp. 2004); Onto
Itriv. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (West Stipp. 2005) (prohibiting recognition of civil unions ex-
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vast policies of the forum—is murkier when the goal is recognition of
the civil union per se, rather than the parental rights flowing from it.
Analysis of this factor would require an assessment of the forum state's
treatment of gays and lesbians, as well as, perhaps, cohabitants. Clearly,
the enactment of a DOMA would provide ammunition for those claim-
ing a policy in the forum against recognizing same-sex unions. The in-
terests of the original home state—the third factor—are the same as
those we saw previously and include interests in ensuring equality for its
citizens, should they move out of the jurisdiction, and in protecting es-
pecially the children in those relationships from instability and uncer-
tainty regarding those adults responsible for them. 431 The fourth fac-
tor—the protection of justified expectations—arguably points more
strongly toward recognition when dealing with civil unions and domes-
tic partnerships, because most states have not enacted laws expressly
declining to recognize them. Nonetheless, the novelty of these schemes
weakens the contention that partners expect the status to be accepted
without challenge in other jurisdictions.432 The basic policies underly-
ing family law applicable to civil union recognition include those re-
lated to children as well as the more general goal of encouraging family
stability, clarifying familial obligations, and protecting family members'
expectations, all of which support recognition. The final two factors—
certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and ease of determi-
nation and application of the law—do not differ significantly when
considering recognition of civil unions, as opposed to the earlier focus
on parental rights. 433 Neither would seem significant enough to sway
the determination one way or the other.
Although on balance these factors should lead to recognition,
the answer is not clear-cut. As we have just seen from the few cases de-
cided, courts likely will disagree about whether and in what contexts
to give effect to a foreign civil union or domestic partnership. 434
If a court refused to apply Vermont or California law and to rec-
ognize the civil union or domestic partnership, the distinction be-
tween marriage and these alternate statuses could affect our same-sex
partner negatively. In jurisdictions following the UPA, a co-parent like
Sarah would no longer be able to argue for presumed motherhood
pressly); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204(c) (Vernon Stipp. 2004); supra note 403 (discussing
Rosengarten, 802 A.2d at 182).
431 See Opinions of theJustices, 802 N.E.2d at 576.
432 DeFranco, supra note 426, at 275-76.
433 See supra notes 344-346 and accompanying text.
434 See Rosengarten, 802 A.2d at 184; Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 49; Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
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.based on an invalid marriage, although she could try to achieve the
same status by showing that she held out Madeleine as her own and
received her into her home. 435 Likewise, the decision not to treat the
civil union or domestic partnership as a marriage could call into ques-
tion arguments based on legitimacy. However, by granting partners to
civil unions or domestic partnerships rights identical to their married
counterparts, both statutes doubtless implicitly confer legitimacy on
the children born to the couple.436
Moreover, any distinction between civil unions, domestic part-
nership, and marriages would be unavailable to litigants in the states
that have adopted so-called "super-DOMAs," which explicitly prohibit
recognition of civil unions and/or domestic partnerships.437 In these
jurisdictions, co-parents would" have to rely on the approaches out-
lined in Parts II.A.2.d and II.A.2.e. 438 Unfortunately, three of these
states— Florida, Ohio, and Texas—explicitly deny recognition not. just
to the alternate relationship, but also to any right or claim arising
from the relationship.439 Hence, neither a civil union nor a domestic
partnership would likely benefit a co-parent seeking parental rights in
these jurisdictions. The co-parent's only hope would be to meet the
435 See ALA. Cons § 26-17-18 (1992); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650 (West 2004); COI.O. REV.
STAT. § 19-4-122 (2003); Haw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 584-21 (Michie 1999); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 45/19 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1126 (2000); MINN. STAT. § 257.71
(2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.848 (West 2004); MONT. Coot: ANN. § 40-6-121 (2003); NEv.
REV. STAT. ANN. 126.231 (Michie 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-21 (Michie 1999); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-17-20 (2004); Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.17 (West 2003); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-8-26 (2003); sec Karen C., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 681; Rubano, 759 A.2d at 971. Con-
tra KM., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 151 (finding paternity presumptions evidentiary and only ap-
plicable when needed to identify natural mother).
438 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 554 (2002) (child considered legitimate when parents
intermarry); id. at tit. 15, § 1204(f) (rights of parties to a civil union identical to those of a
married couple with respect to a child of one); Langan, 765 N.YS.2d at 417 (civil union
statute includes a "presumption of legitimacy" for children born of the union).
4$7 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West Supp. 2004); Onto REV.
CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (West Supp. 2005); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204(c) (Vernon Supp.
2004). For discussion regarding whether Montana's statute also fits into this category, see
supra note 89.
438 See supra notes 268-389 and accompanying text.
499
	 STAT. ANN. § 741.212(2); OHIO REV, Cons ANN. § 3101.01; Tex. FAN+. CODE
ANN. § 6.204(c) (2). Nebraska's "super-DOMA" simply provides that "Nile uniting of two
persons of the same sex in civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex
relationship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska." NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29. This
provision still leaves open the possibility of seeking recognition of the parent-child rela-
tionship created by the civil union based on the arguments discussed in supra notes 128-
390 and accompanying text.
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state's qualifications for third-party visitation or to pursue one of the
alternative strategies outlined in Part IV. 41°
III. SEEKING CUSTODY OR VISITATION AS A THIRD PARTY
If a court refused to grant Sarah standing as a parent based on
the marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership, each of these
statuses still might assist Sarah by helping to establish threshold re-
quirements for standing based on other statutory or equitable
grounds. Most states grant standing to petition for custody or visita-
tion to certain individuals who do not meet the traditional definition
of parent—biological or adoptive—in at least some circumstances."'
The statutes and cases establishing this right vary from one state to
the next, but they share certain features. Most require the person
seeking some form of parental rights, either custody or visitation, to
have acted as a parent to the child and to have developed a corre-
sponding parent-child bond.442 Depending on the wording of the
statute or the judicial precedent, the petitioner may have to establish
that she acted either in loco parentis, as a de facto custodian, or as a
440 See supra notes 453-467 and accompanying text.
"' 
see, eg ARIa. Rxv. S t AT. ANN. § 25-415 (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-
57 (West 2004); Dn.. Cont ANN. tit. 13, § 721(e) (1999); HAw. Itcv. STAT. ANN. § 571-46
(2), (7) (Michie Supp. 2003); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.020(3) (Michie 1999); ME. Rcv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653(2)(B), (C) (West 1998); Mlctt. COMP. LAWS § 722.26c (1998)
(Micit. STAT. ANN. § 25.312(6c) (Michie Supp. 2000)); MINN. STAT. § 257C.03 subd. 7
(2003); Mohr. Coin: ANN. §§ 40-4-211 (4) (b), 40-4-228 (2003); OR. REV. S •ENE. § 109.119
(2003); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(9) (Vernon Supp. 2004); VA. Copt: ANN. § 16.1-
278.15(B) (Michie Supp. 2004), § 20-49.2 (Michie 2004); WAsn. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.10.030 (West Supp. 2004); Wvu. STAT. ANN. § 20.7-102(a) (Michie 2003); Buness v.
Gillen, 781 P.2d 985, 987-88 (Alaska 1989); Hardy v. Arcemont, 444 S.E.2d 327, 329-30 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1994); In re Paternity of J.A.C., 734 N.E.2d 1057, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Lamp
v. Lamp, 833 So. 2d 1224, 1227 (Lt. Ct. App. 2002); LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151,
168 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Smith v. Barbour, 571 S.E.2d 872, 877-78 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002);
L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 914 (Pa. 2001); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 977 (R.I.
2000); State ex rel. J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 715-16 (Utah 1990); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 533
N.W.2d 419, 435 (Wis. 1995). In addition, all fifty states provide for grandparent visitation,
although a number of these statutes have been declared unconstitutional after Troxel u
Granville. Dolgin, supra note 305, at 396-401; Dwyer, supra note 305, at 977-81.
442 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257C.08 subd. 4 (visitation); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-228
(any parental interest); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (visitation, custody, or guardianship);
Ncv. REV. STAT. ANN. 125C.050(2) (Michie 2004) (visitation); Hardy, 444 S.E.2d at 330
(granting standing to 'the physical custodian to whom the mother entrusted the child"
and with whom the child had a parental relationship); Tinsley v. Plummer, 519 N.E.2d 752,
754 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (denying great aunt both custody and visitation when no custo-
dial and parental relationship was shown); J.W.F., 799 P.2d at 715 (noting that standing to
pursue custody may be allowed based on the relationship to the child and whether that
relationship signals that the petitioner likely has the child's best interests at heart).
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primary caregiver for a certain amount of time. 443
 Some statutes sim-
ply refer to "other person [s] " who may file suit for custody or visita-
tion, although the statute or courts typically limit this language to
those who can demonstrate an established relationship with the
child.444
 In addition, several states have explicitly allowed same-sex co-
parents to petition for visitation on equitable grounds if they meet
certain requirements:
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and
fostered, the parent-like relationship with the child; (2) that
the [co-parent] and the child lived together in the same
household; (3) that the [co-parent] assumed obligations of
parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child's
care, education and development, including contributing
towards the child's support, without expectation of financial
compensation; and (4) that the petitioner has been in a pa-
rental role for a length of time sufficient to have established
with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in
nature,445
The same-sex marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership arguably
establishes the first prong of the test—that the legal parent consented
to the creation of a parent-like relationship with the child. The rela-
tionship also supplies some evidence of the second prong, because
the marriage by law confers on the co-parent obligations to support
the child. Likewise, some of the third-party statutes seem apt to afford
445
 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-415 (providing that a person other than legal
parent, standing in loco parentis, can file petition for custody if detrimental to child to be
placed with legal parent); COLO. REV, STAT, § 14-10-123(11) (c) (2003) (allowing petition by
non-parent who had physical care for at least six months if filed within six months of ter-
mination of care); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46(2) (allowing custody to de facto custo-
dian), § 571-46(7) (allowing visitation to "any person interested in the welfare of the
child"); Kv. REV. STAT. ANN, § 405.020(3) (allowing de facto custodian to petition for cus-
tody); Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(9) (allowing person who had "care, control, and
possession of the child for at least six months ending not more than 90 days preceding" to
file petition for custody); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.2 (allowing person in loco parentis to peti-
tion); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-102 (allowing primary caregiver for six or more months to
sue for visitation if parents' rights not substantially impaired).
444
 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-211 (4) (b), (6); Smith, 571 S.E.2d at 877; Ellison v.
Ramos, 502 S.E.2d 891, 894 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (interpreting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1
(1995)). Likewise, courts have found a relationship with the child .necessary to confer
standing without relying on specific statutory language. See Buness, 781 P.2d at 988; Seyboth
v. Seyboth, 554 S.E.2d 378, 381 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001);/ W.F., 799 P.2d at 715.
445
 E.g., V.C. v. MJ.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551 (N.J. 2000); H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d at 421; see
E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2c1 886, 891-94 (Mass. 1999); TB., 786 A.2d at 916-17.
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standing to a lesbian co-parent whose marriage was invalidated, at
least under the circumstances in our hypothetical, when the co-parent
clearly acted as the primary caregiver and developed a parent-child
relationship.
Nonetheless, there are several potential pitfalls to relying on these
statutory provisions and precedents. First, some of them incorporate
additional threshold requirements for standing which may be difficult
if not impossible to prove, such as unsuitability of the legal parent. 446
Others require a showing that no substantial interference with or
significant impairment of the legal parent's rights will result, but may
provide no guidance as to the meaning of those terms. 447
 Second, some
statutes and even the cases recognizing a lesbian co-parent's standing
explicitly limit third parties to suits for visitation, leaving them unable
to pursue custody. 448
 Third, some explicitly limit third-party claims to
members of designated groups, such as grandparents, stepparents, or
relatives.449
 Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, the person seeking
parental rights as a non-legal parent likely will be treated as a third
party, not as a co-equal parent. 45° As a result, the co-parent will not be
446 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-415 (requiring that placement with legal parent
would be detrimental to child); Dn. Come ANN. tit. 13, § 721(e) (requiring that child be
dependent or neglected); MINN. STAT. § 257C.03 subd.7 (requiring that parent has aban-
doned or neglected child so child will be harmed or physical or requiring emotional dan-
ger to child or other extraordinary circumstances); WAsit. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.030(1)
(requiring that child is not in parent's physical custody or that parent is unsuitable); In re
Custody of S.H.B., 74 P.3d 674, 679 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003), review granted sub nom., In re
Custody of Brown, 94 P.3d 959 (Wash. 2004) (affirming that non-parent petitioner must
show that the parent is unfit, that living with the parent would harm the child's develop-
ment, or that an award of custody to the non-parent is in the child's best interest); In re
Custody of Nunn, 14 P.3d 175, 181 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that non-parent peti-
tioner must show unfitness of parent with custody in order to gain standing).
447 See, e.g., Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-102; Lindsie D.L. v. Richard W.S., 591 S.E.2d 308,
314 (W. Va. 2003).
446
 See, e.g., NEV. REV, STAT. ANN. 125C.050(2) (Michie 2004); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-
102; H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d at 423-24, 437 (holding that lesbian co-parent could bring
visitation action, but had no standing to seek custody in the absence of parental unfitness).
446 See, e.g., Lk. CIV. CODE ANN, art. 136(B) (West 1999) (allowing visitation only for
those related by blood or affinity, former stepparents, or former grandparents); Micti.
Comr. LAWS § 722.26c(b)(iii) (1998) (Mimi. STAT. ANN. § 25.312(6c) (Michie Supp.
2000)) (requiring relation by blood, affinity, or marriage within fifth degree); Worrell v.
Elkhart County Office of Family & Children, 704 N.E.2d 1027, 1029 (Ind. 1998) (limiting
third-party standing to stepparents).
45° See, e.g., Butters, 781 P.2d at 988-89; Seyboth, 554 S.E.2d at 381; Dwyer, supra note 305,
at 982. But see Ky. REV. STA'F. ANN. § 405.020(3) (Michie 1999) (providing that de facto cus-
todian petition determined by best interests standard and that de facto custodian must take,
parents' place); J.A.C., 734 N.E.2d. at 1060 (providing that once "custodial and parental"
relationship is established by a third party, visitation should be determined by best interests
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entitled to prevail by showing merely that custody or visitation would be
in the child's best interests; rather, she will have to meet a considerably
more difficult test, reflecting the constitutionally elevated status en-
joyed by legal parents. Most states require a third party seeking custody
to demonstrate that the legal parent is unfit, that custody would be det-
rimental to the child, or that other extraordinary circumstances justify
interference with the legal parent's right to control the care, custody,
and upbringing of his or her children. 4" Although some states have
used the less stringent "best interests of the child" standard to award
visitation to third parties, those statutes and rulings are subject to con-
stitutional challenge under Troxe1.452
standard). This argument might run into difficulty in the "category two" DOMA states.
Those DOMAs prohibit use of the marriage for any purpose. On the one hand, a very broad
reading of the statute conceivably could prevent a co-parent from relying on the marriage
to establish any of the requirements for third-party standing. On the other hand, the bio-
logical parent's agreement to allow the co-parent to assume a parental role likely can be
established in most of these cases by alternate means, including the conduct of the parties.
451 See, e.g., NEV. REV, STA•. ANN. 125.500(1) (stating that non-parent must show paren-
tal custody would cause substantial harm to the child); Thomas v. Thomas, 49 P.3d 306,
309 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that third party seeking custody must show significant
detriment to the child if a legal parent has custody); Lamp V. Lamp, 833 So. 2d 1224, 1229
(La. Ct. App. 2002); Lynda AIL v. Diane TO., 673 N.Y.S.2d 989, 990 (App. Div. 1998)
(holding that third party must show parental abandonment, neglect, or other extraordi-
nary circumstances); Owenby v. Young, 579 S.E.2d 264, 267 (N.C. 2003) (concerning
methods of showing natural parent forfeiting protected status); Ellison, 502 S.E.2d at 896
(holding that third party must show parent has taken actions inconsistent with his or her
constitutionally protected status before considering best interests); In the Interest of
D.P.O., 667 N.W.2d 590, 592 (N.D. 2003) (noting that "(al bsent exceptional circumstances
triggering a best-interest analysis" the natural parent will prevail in a custody dispute with a
non-parent); Simons v. Gisvold, 519 N.W.2d 585, 587 (N.D. 1994) (stating that non-parent
must show custody by legal parent would result in serious harm or detriment to the child);
TB., 786 A.2d at 919 n.8 (noting that in third-party custody dispute "the burden of proof is
not evenly balanced and ... the evidentiary scale is tipped hard to the biological parent's
side"); Quinn v. Mouw-Quinn, 552 N.W.2d 843, 846 (S.D. 1996) (holding that stepfather
must shoW extraordinary circumstances justifying visitation). But see Worrell, 704 N.E.2d at
1028-29 (concluding that once standing established, visitation determined by best inter-
ests standard, but that standing limited to stepparents); J.W.E, 799 P.2d at 715 (concluding
that stepparent had standing to seek custody if in the best interest of the child).
452 Dwyer, supra note 305, at 972-73, 978-80 (describing "prevailing standard" under
grandparent visitation statutes as best interests of the child—standard in doubt since
Troxel); see In re Marriage of James and Claudine W., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 463-65 (Ct. App.
2003) (declaring stepparent visitation statute applying best interests standard unconstitu-
tional as applied); Commonwealth ex rel. Husack v. Husack, 417 A.2d 233, 235-36 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1979) (upholding custody award based on the best interests of the children).
But see Rideout v, Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 303 (Me. 2000) (finding constitutional the
awarding of visitation to grandparents acting as parents based on best interests standard);
Rubano, 759 A.2d at 974-77 (holding that biological parent's agreement to have lesbian
partner assume de facto parent status supported standing for partner to seek visitation).
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IV. STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES
The preceding analysis demonstrates that same-sex parents can
garner important substantive parental rights by marrying or entering
into a civil union or domestic partnership in their home states, and
they can make powerful arguments for retaining those rights in other
jurisdictions, even those with DOMAs. Nonetheless, the outcome for
these parents is far from certain, and they remain vulnerable to de-
struction of their parental rights if they or the biological parent move
outside the home jurisdiction.
Same-sex parents can solidify their rights by adopting their
spouse or partner's child. 453
 Same-sex marriages, civil unions, and
domestic partnerships each allow for adoption .by the partner without
termination of the biological parent's parental rights.454 Adoption
would increase the likelihood of recognition by a sister state jurisdic-
tion for two reasons.
First, an adoption constitutes a legal judgment. In interpreting
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court long has
drawn a distinction between interstate recognition of laws and of
judgments. The Full Faith and Credit Clause generally requires a state
to recognize judgments of sister states, while allowing the state more
latitude to avoid recognition of sister state laws that violate its public
policy.455
 States are not free to refuse to enforce a judgment on public
policy grounds. 456
This requirement would not apply to a Canadian adoption de-
cree, as the Full Faith and Credit Clause governs interstate obliga-
tions, but not international ones. 457 However, most states would rec-
ognize an adoption decree lawfully issued in a foreign jurisdiction
455
 Mark Strasser, When Is a Parent Not a Parent? On DOMA, Civil Unions, and Presump-
tions of Parenthood, 23 CAknozo L. REV. 299, 315-16 (2001).
454
 Couples who marry in Massachusetts or Canada could complete a stepparent adop-
tion, as can couples who enter into a civil union in Vermont or register as domestic part-
ners in California. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 2A (2002); D.(A.N.S.), Re, 1998 Carswell
Sask 710; see also CAI.. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1204 (e) (4) (2002). Indeed, each of these states allows same-sex partner adoptions even
in the absence of marriage, union, or partnership. See Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d
554, 558 (Cal. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1220 (2004); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d
315, 321 (Mass. 1993); B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 1993).
455
 Barbara J. Cox, Adoptions by Lesbian and Gay Parents Must Be Recognized by Sister States
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause Despite Anti-Marriage Statutes That Discriminate Against
Same-Sex Couples, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 751, 764, 771 (2003); Strasser, supra note 453, at 323.
456 Strasser, supra note 453, at 323.
457 Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foun-
dations of Choice of Law, 92 Coins'. L. REV. 249, 259-60 (1992).
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based on principles of comity or statutes specifically providing for
such recognition.458
Second, neither the federal DOMA nor state DOMAs tracking its
language can block recognition of the adoption. 45" The federal
DOMA provides as follows:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or
Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State ... re-
specting a relationship between persons of the same sex that
is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State
. . . or a right or claim arising from such relationship: 160
Although some have suggested that the federal DOMA's reference to
judicial proceedings calls into question the longstanding conclusion
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause obliges states to honor other
states' judgments, an adoptive parent can argue that the DOMA
would not apply.46i Because adoption is available to same-sex partners
who do not marry or enter into a civil union or domestic partnership
in those jurisdictions, 462 the adoption would not constitute a right or
claim "arising from" a marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership,
and thus would fall outside even the broadest possible interpretation
of the DOMA.463
Adoption thus offers another avenue for acquiring parental rights.
It undoubtedly carries with it more likelihood of out-o f-state recogni-
tion, but the DOMAs inject some uncertainty into this conclusion as
well. Moreover, same-sex partners who marry or enter into one of the
alternative state-sanctioned relationships should not have to undertake
the added time and expense of an adoption. The whole point of these
laws is to equalize the position of gay couples and families tinder the
law. Requiring an adoption would impose a burden on these couples
not suffered by their married heterosexual counterparts. 464
458 Erika Lynn Kleiman, Caring for Our Own: Why American Adoption Law and Policy Must
Change, 30 Count. J.L. & Soc. l'Rops. 327,352 (1997).
458 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 2004).
488 Id. (emphasis added).
481 See generally, e.g., Whitten, supra note 18. Other scholars doubt the constitutionality
of this interpretation. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 455, at 771-79.
482 See supra note 454 (citing cases allowing sane-sex partner adoption in Vermont,
Massachusetts, and California).
48/ See Strasser, supra note 453, at 321.
484 See Robson, supra note 147, at 31-33 (critiquing the lesbian movement for second-
parent adoptions).
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Ultimately, the best hope for consistent recognition of parental
rights for same-sex parents probably lies with the U.S. Constitution.
True uniformity can be achieved in two ways: by recognizing that the
prohibition on same-sex marriage violates due process and equal pro-
tection465
 or by recognizing that stripping a parent of parental rights
based on choice of law or statutory principles impermissibly deprives
her of due process and equal protection and may run afoul of the Full
Faith and Credit and Privileges and Immunities Clauses. 466 Of course,
a legislative solution also could solve the problem, but is virtually
unimaginable at this point, given the intense polarization of legisla-
tures and the public on this issue. 467
CONCLUSION
The opportunity for same-sex couples to marry and to enter into
civil unions and domestic partnerships has brought gays and lesbians
unprecedented rights, perhaps none more meaningful than legal rec-
ognition as parents. This development promises to strengthen fami-
lies and to protect the best interests of children by ensuring that chil-
dren will have two parents legally bound to care for them and that
they will continue to enjoy meaningful contact with both parents who
have loved, nurtured, and supported them, even in the face of disso-
lution of the parents' relationship. Although grave questions exist re-
garding the portability of the parents' marital status, particularly due
to the proliferation of DOMAs throughout the nation, parental rights
can survive the invalidation of the parents' marriage. The UPA,
precedents regarding legitimacy of children, and general choice of
law principles all provide potent arguments for advocates seeking to
preserve the parental rights of a same-sex partner. Similar arguments
can be adapted for couples from Vermont and California who enter
into civil unions or register as domestic partners. As the courts grap-
ple with this question in the years to come, we only can hope that the
465 Sec Goodridge v. Dept of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003). Sec gener-
ally Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great, Slumbering Baehr: On
Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64 Fonntimu L lbw. 921
(1995) (arguing that the refusal to recognize same-sex marriages violates the due process
and equal protection guarantees in the Constitution).
466 A full discussion of these challenges is beyond the scope of this Article, but is being
addressed by me in a separate Article.
467 See Michael Christopher Brian, Gay Fin. Network, Poll Show Americans Against Gay
Marriage, at http://www.gfn.com/archives/story.phunl?sid =15491 (Apr. 12, 2004); see also
Frost, supra note 391; Sujo, supra note 391.
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results will serve justice and promote the welfare of the children in-
volved by affirming the parent-child relationship created by a mar-
riage, civil union, or domestic partnership with the state's blessing.
